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26. TORT LAW 
Kumaralingam AMIRTHALINGAM 
LLB (Hons), PhD (Australian National University); 
Professor, Faculty of Law; 
Chair, NUS Teaching Academy, 
National University of Singapore. 
Gary CHAN Kok Yew 
LLB (Hons), MA (National University of Singapore), MA (Birmingham), 
LLM, BA (University of London); 
Professor, School of Law; 
Director, Juris Doctor Programme, 
Singapore Management University. 
Breach of statutory duty 
26.1 The plaintiff in Tan Bee Hock v F G Builders Pte Ltd1 was riding 
a motorbike when he skidded on a metal plate placed by the defendant 
at the entrance to a condominium. The plaintiff sued for his injuries in 
negligence, nuisance, and breach of statutory duty. On the facts, Kannan 
Ramesh JC (as his Honour then was) found that there was nothing 
unsafe about the metal plate and dismissed the claims in nuisance and 
negligence. Having found that the defendants had not done anything 
unsafe, Ramesh JC also dismissed the breach of statutory duty action, 
and in doing so, observed that even if the defendant had breached the 
Code of Practice for Traffic Control at Work Zone (2006 Ed), this code 
was not intended to give rise to a private cause of action, being designed 
only to offer practical guidance on traffic safety rather than to impose 
legal obligations. 
Conspiracy 
26.2 United Overseas Bank Ltd v Lippo Marina Collection Pte Ltd2 
concerns the vexed question of the attributability to a company of the 
knowledge of an officer or director of the company in the context of a 
conspiracy claim. The plaintiff bank made claims in conspiracy against 
all eight defendants involved and deceit against two of the defendants. 
The first defendant was a developer, the second and third defendants 
were real estate agents, and the fourth to eight defendants were the 
second and third defendants’ relatives. The allegations were that: 
                                                                        
1 [2016] 2 SLR 940. 
2 [2016] 2 SLR 597. 
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(a) the eight defendants had conspired to obtain financing 
from the bank in contravention of cooling-off measures 
implemented by the Monetary Authority of Singapore; and 
(b) the second and third defendants misled the bank into 
granting the loans based on inflated purchase prices. 
The second and third defendants, in turn, alleged that the plaintiff ’s 
vice-president of home loans had knowledge of the matters in 
connection with the loans and had suggested the transfer of moneys 
between bank accounts (the very acts alleged by the plaintiff to be 
fraudulent). The second and third defendants, therefore, argued that 
such knowledge and acts of the employee or officer would be attributed 
to the plaintiff bank; and, as a result, the plaintiff should be estopped 
from making those claims against them. 
26.3 The High Court applied the Re Hampshire Land3 principle to 
preclude the defendants from relying on the rules of attribution in order 
to attribute the knowledge and acts of the officer to the plaintiff so as to 
defeat the plaintiff ’s claims. In Re Hampshire Land Co4 (“Re Hampshire 
Land”), the issue was whether a building society which had lent money 
to a company should be imputed with the knowledge of its secretary 
regarding a defect in the resolution passed by the company’s 
shareholders. The secretary’s knowledge of the defect was acquired 
whilst he was acting as a secretary of the company. Vaughan Williams J 
held that the secretary’s knowledge could not be imputed to the building 
society unless he owed the society a duty to disclose the information.5 
26.4 In England, the attribution principle has been applied to prevent 
imputation of wrongdoing, or knowledge of such wrongdoing, by 
directors of a company that is a victim of such wrongdoing.6 In a related 
vein, the directors will not be entitled to raise the defence of ex turpi 
causa based on the attribution of knowledge to the company.7 This may 
be contrasted with the recent Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal decision 
of Moulin Global Eyecare Trading Ltd v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue,8 in which knowledge of the directors as to their fraudulent 
inflation of profits was attributed to the company in respect of the 
liquidator’s claim against the Commissioner of Inland Revenue to 
reclaim the taxes which were paid. 
                                                                        
3 Re Hampshire Land Co [1896] 2 Ch 743. 
4 [1896] 2 Ch 743. 
5 Re Hampshire Land Co [1896] 2 Ch 743 at 749. 
6 See Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] 2 All ER 1083. 
7 See Ho Kang Peng v Scintronix Corp Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 329. 
8 [2014] 3 HKC 323. 
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26.5 Ultimately, attribution rules should be applied in a manner 
sensitive to the context of the statutory rule in question and its 
underlying purpose. One public policy rationale is that a company 
should not be denied redress against a defaulting director by virtue of 
the attribution of the wrongdoer’s culpability to the company.9 Seen in 
this light, the Re Hampshire Land principle should also be applied to the 
present case where the plaintiff bank was seeking to show that it was a 
victim of fraud in which the defendants were complicit.10 As a result, the 
defendants could not rely on the officer’s knowledge to argue estoppel or 
lack of inducement on the part of the plaintiff. 
26.6 The High Court also struck out the defence; 12 of the 15 
averments in the defence were barred by the Re Hampshire Land 
principle. The remaining three averments raised contributory 
negligence, which, according to the learned judicial commissioner, were 
not viable defences to the torts of deceit and conspiracy.11 
26.7 In Syed Ahmad Jamal Alsagoff v Harun bin Syed Hussain 
Aljunied,12 the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they were entitled to 
certain leasehold interests in three properties. They alleged that in 1994, 
the fourth to seventh defendants purportedly conveyed the reversionary 
and leasehold interests in the properties to the third defendant and, 
subsequently, the same parties entered into a deed of rectification and 
confirmation. In addition, the plaintiffs claimed that the conveyance and 
deed were executed either in fraud and/or conspiracy. Whilst the claim 
relating to the leasehold interests succeeded, the latter claims were 
dismissed. 
26.8 With respect to the fraud claim, the plaintiffs failed to plead the 
elements of a specific cause of action. Aedit Abdullah JC held that it was 
not sufficient merely to plead fraud simpliciter. More specifically, the 
pleadings did not allege any representation by the defendants, nor any 
inducement or reliance by any party, both of which are necessary 
elements to establish the tort of deceit or fraudulent misrepresentation. 
26.9 As for the conspiracy claim, the actions of the fourth to seventh 
defendants in making an ex parte application to have themselves 
appointed as trustees of certain trusts did not involve the other 
defendants or any common design amongst them. Thus, the plaintiffs 
                                                                        
9 United Overseas Bank Ltd v Lippo Marina Collection Pte Ltd [2016] 2 SLR 597 
at [52]; see also Hans Tjio, Pearlie Koh & Lee Pey Woan, Corporate Law 
(Academy Publishing, 2015) at para 07.044. 
10 Bilta (UK) Ltd v Nazir [2015] 2 All ER 1083 at [84], per Lord Sumption. 
11 DBS Bank Ltd v Carrier Singapore (Pte) Ltd [2008] 3 SLR(R) 261 at [92], citing 
Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp [2003] 1 AC 959. 
12 [2017] 3 SLR 386. 
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failed to prove a combination or an agreement amongst the defendants 
in pursuit of a common design, which is a requirement in conspiracy 
whether by lawful or unlawful means. With respect to lawful means 
conspiracy, the learned judge observed that there was a lack of evidence 
pertaining to any predominant purpose on the part of the defendants to 
injure the plaintiffs. Moreover, Abdullah JC noted that “a wrong 
assertion of property rights is not in itself necessarily a tort” and will not 
give rise to unlawful means conspiracy.13 
26.10 In Beyonics Technology Ltd v Goh Chan Peng,14 the first plaintiff, 
Beyonics Technology Ltd, a company incorporated in Singapore, and the 
second plaintiff, a subsidiary company of the first plaintiff, were part of 
the “Beyonics Group”. The first plaintiff claimed that the first defendant, 
the former director and chief executive officer of the plaintiffs, the third 
defendant, and another party conspired to make payments under certain 
agreements, divert work from the Beyonics Group to a competitor of the 
Beyonics Group, and ultimately hollow out the Beyonics Group’s 
baseplate business with its customers. There was an agreement between 
the parties to divert baseplates from the Beyonics Group to the 
competitor for the work to be done by the latter. It was clearly agreed 
that payments would accrue to the first defendant through the third 
defendant. 
26.11 Hoo Sheau Peng JC denied the claim in unlawful conspiracy 
due to a lack of evidence of an “obvious agreement” between the alleged 
conspirators to do acts which would hollow out the baseplate business of 
the Beyonics Group entirely. Strictly speaking, there was no requirement 
for an “obvious agreement” to commit the acts. What was required, 
however, was a combination between the alleged conspirators; in fact, 
the agreement, if any, might be tacit in nature or inferred from the 
parties’ acts.15 
26.12 The learned judge also found that the predominant intention of 
the first and third defendants was to benefit the first defendant and the 
competitor and that “the necessary corollary of the benefit to the 
[competitor] was loss to the First Plaintiff ”16 due to the direct diversion 
of the baseplates. The learned judge concluded that if the first and third 
defendants intended to benefit the competitor, they must also have 
intended to injure the first plaintiff, even if this intention was not 
                                                                        
13 Syed Ahmad Jamal Alsagoff v Harun bin Syed Hussain Aljunied [2017] 3 SLR 386 
at [68]. 
14 [2016] 4 SLR 472. 
15 See EFT Holdings Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 
at [113]. 
16 Beyonics Technology Ltd v Goh Chan Peng [2016] 4 SLR 472; [2016] SGHC 120 
at [162]. 
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predominant. Hoo JC was correct to highlight that for unlawful means 
conspiracy, the intention of the conspirators to injure the plaintiff needs 
not be a “predominant” intention. This technique of treating the benefit 
to the competitor as a corollary to the loss to the first plaintiff has also 
been applied in Singapore in the context of a lawful means conspiracy 
claim.17 
26.13 In Simgood Pte Ltd v MLC Barging Pte Ltd,18 the appellant, 
Simgood Pte Ltd (“Simgood”), had entered into a shipbuilding contract 
with MLC Shipbuilding Sdn Bhd (“MLC Shipbuilding”) in which the 
latter was to construct and deliver a vessel with a specific hull number to 
Simgood. MLC Shipbuilding failed to deliver the vessel. Simgood 
alleged that the respondents (comprising shareholders or directors of 
MLC Shipbuilding or its affiliate companies) had conspired to switch 
the hull number of the vessel with that of another vessel that had a later 
completion date. 
26.14 The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge’s finding in 
Simgood Pte Ltd v MLC Shipbuilding Sdn Bhd19 that the respondents 
wanted to postpone the repayment of a loan facility extended by a bank. 
There was, therefore, no unlawful means conspiracy as the respondents’ 
acts of switching the hull numbers were not carried out to injure Simgood. 
Referencing the prior Court of Appeal decision in EFT Holdings Inc v 
Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd20 (“EFT”), it is clear that the 
respondents’ actions in the present case were not targeted or directed at 
Simgood; for the action in conspiracy to succeed, the injury to the 
claimant must have been intended as a means to an end or as an end 
in itself. 
26.15 Furthermore, Simgood’s claim in inducement of breach of 
contract against the respondents could not be established. There was no 
causal connection between the respondents’ actions in switching the hull 
numbers and the breach of contract by MLC Shipbuilding in failing to 
deliver the vessel. 
26.16 The case of Max-Sun Trading Ltd v Tang Mun Kit21 concerned 
the intentional state of mind for the tort of conspiracy and inducing 
breach of contract respectively. The first plaintiff was a fabric 
manufacturer and the second plaintiff was a buying house which entered 
                                                                        
17 See Raffles Town Club Pte Ltd v Lim Eng Hock Peter [2013] 1 SLR 374 at [66]–[67], 
citing Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174. 
18 [2016] SGCA 46. 
19 [2016] 1 SLR 1129. 
20 [2014] 1 SLR 860 at [101]. 
21 [2016] 5 SLR 815. 
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into contracts to supply garments to clothing companies and 
subcontracted actual manufacturing to other companies. The 
defendants, who were married to each other, ran a garment business. 
The defendants and the Tans (comprising Peter Tan, an undischarged 
bankrupt, and his wife) were shareholders and directors of Elda Instinct 
Garments Pte Ltd, a Singapore-incorporated company (“Elda Singapore”). 
Elda Singapore loaned money from the plaintiffs for use as working 
capital for a new factory in Vietnam. Elda Instinct Garments Vietnam 
Co Ltd (“Elda Vietnam”) was incorporated as a subsidiary company to 
Elda Singapore. 
26.17 Subsequently, conflicts arose between the first defendant and 
Peter Tan over the alleged mismanagement of the Elda companies. Upon 
persuasion by a third party, the first defendant agreed to Peter Tan being 
appointed as legal representative and general director of Elda Vietnam 
and authorised representative of Elda Singapore, positions originally 
held by the first defendant. Later in November 2008, the defendants 
voted in a meeting to remove Peter Tan from his positions and to 
reappoint the first defendant. They used the resolution to obtain an 
amended investment certificate from the Vietnamese authority. This led 
to the tussle for and eventual confiscation of the investment certificate 
by the police, the freezing of Elda Vietnam’s bank accounts to which 
Peter Tan had access, and the unavailability of the company seal for 
affixing to the certificate of origin in respect of the goods. The events 
resulted in significant delays to the exports of garments by the second 
plaintiff. Subsequent court proceedings in Vietnam resulted in the 
cessation of orders placed with the second plaintiff and the winding-up 
of both the Elda companies. The plaintiffs commenced actions in tort, 
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and relief under s 340(1) of 
the Companies Act22 against the defendants, all of which failed. 
26.18 In particular, the claim in unlawful means conspiracy was 
denied. The first defendant had intentionally misstated the minutes of a 
meeting to give the impression to the Vietnamese authority that the 
removal of Peter Tan had been approved with a proper quorum. 
However, there was no evidence that the second defendant agreed to 
pursue the same course of conduct or shared the same objectives as the 
first defendant. Hence, the first element of a combination amongst 
conspirators was missing. Moreover, applying the test in EFT,23 the 
defendants did not intend to injure the second plaintiff. According to 
Judith Prakash JA, the fraud was aimed at forcing Peter Tan out of power 
so that the first defendant would have control of Elda Vietnam. Here, 
the learned judge made an important distinction between recklessness 
                                                                        
22 Cap 50, 2006 Rev Ed. 
23 EFT Holdings Inc v Marinteknik Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 at [101]. 
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as to “the loss which would probably or inevitably be caused to the 
plaintiffs” and the loss being “a means to an end or an end in itself ” 
which was required under the test for conspiracy.24 
26.19 Similarly, for the claim in inducing breach of contract, the 
defendants, though they were aware of the existence of the loan and 
supply contracts between Elda Singapore and the plaintiffs, did not 
intend for them to be breached. The breach of contract must have been 
intended either as a means to an end or the end itself,25 a requirement 
which was not satisfied on the facts. 
26.20 The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM International Ltd26  
(“The Wellness Group”) discussed the requirement of the acts and 
predominant motive to injure the plaintiffs as well as the meaning and 
scope of unlawful means in conspiracy. There was also a separate claim 
in defamation, which will be examined in paras 26.39–26.49 below. 
There were two conspiracy actions: the first plaintiff, TWG, against the 
first to sixth defendants comprising OSIM, Paris (OSIM’s subsidiary), 
and the directors, in conspiracy to injure; and the second plaintiff, the 
chairman of TWG, against the first to third defendants in conspiracy 
to injure. 
26.21 TWG, OSIM, and Paris entered into a shareholders’ agreement 
upon which OSIM purchased a stake in TWG Tea from TWG and Paris. 
One clause provided for the dilution of the shareholding of TWG and 
Paris in favour of OSIM, based on a specified event. TWG, TWG Tea, 
OSIM, and Paris also signed a shareholders’ agreement to set up joint 
venture companies. A dispute arose concerning the price that TWG Tea 
was to charge one joint venture company for its products. 
26.22 The first plaintiff claimed that the first, second, fifth, and 
sixth defendants acted to damage the profitability of TWG by: 
(a) obstructing the efforts of TWG Tea, a subsidiary 
company of TWG, in obtaining financing from a bank; 
(b) acting in concert to procure TWG Tea to supply 
products to the joint venture company at a price substantially 
lower than the price TWG charged other franchisees; and 
(c) reneging on assurances, representations, or 
understandings that OSIM would assist TWG Tea to expand 
                                                                        
24 Max-Sun Trading Ltd v Tang Mun Kit [2016] 5 SLR 815 at [81]. 
25 See M+W Singapore Pte Ltd v Leow Tet Sin [2015] 2 SLR 271 at [90]–[91]. 
26 [2016] 3 SLR 729. 
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locally and internationally, and that OSIM would provide 
shareholder’s loans to TWG Tea for such expansion. 
The first plaintiff also alleged that the first to sixth defendants acted 
wrongfully to enable OSIM to take control of TWG Tea by, amongst 
others, the following acts: 
(a) OSIM wrongfully exercising its rights under the clause 
in the shareholders’ agreement to obtain an additional 10% of 
TWG Tea shares from TWG and Paris; 
(b) the second defendant proposing the rights issue of new 
shares in TWG Tea (“Rights Issue”); and 
(c) OSIM and Paris approving the Rights Issue and 
attempts by the second defendant to further dilute TWG’s 
shareholding in TWG Tea. 
26.23 The claims were dismissed. TWG Tea’s financing efforts were 
not in fact obstructed. OSIM eventually agreed to the subordination 
required by the bank. Though the second, fifth, and sixth defendants 
attempted to procure a price substantially lower than the franchise price, 
they honestly held the view that it was unreasonable to expect the joint 
venture company to pay the franchise price. Moreover, there was no 
commercial unfairness in respect of the Rights Issue. There was a valid 
commercial reason for the Rights Issue and the dilution of TWG’s 
shareholding, though contemplated by the defendants, was not their 
dominant purpose. 
26.24 With respect to the suit by the second plaintiff, the chairman of 
TWG, against the first to third defendants for conspiracy to injure, it 
was alleged that the defendants conspired to injure him by unlawful 
means with the predominant intention of injuring him. The second 
plaintiff pleaded the loss of his salary as chief executive officer (“CEO”) 
of TWG Tea following his resignation. 
26.25 The alleged unlawful means was that the conspirators sought to 
remove the second plaintiff as CEO of TWG Tea in breach of the 
implied term of a shareholders’ agreement. However, as the second 
plaintiff was not a party to the contract, he could not have sued for 
breach of the contract against TWG Tea. The Singapore High Court 
agreed with the second plaintiff that, on the basis of the holding in 
© 2017 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
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Beckkett Pte Ltd v Deutsche Bank AG,27 it was irrelevant whether he was 
entitled to sue on the unlawful means used. 
26.26 In Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total Network SL28 
(“Total Network”) the House of Lords held that the “unlawful means” 
need not be independently actionable by the plaintiff against the 
conspirators in a two-party tort scenario. The criminal offence per se 
committed by the conspirators did not confer a private right of action  
on any person. Notwithstanding that the criminal offence was not 
independently actionable by the plaintiff, the action in unlawful means 
conspiracy succeeded. 
26.27 Unlike the criminal wrong committed by the conspirators in 
Total Network, the present case concerned a civil wrong that was not 
actionable by the plaintiff. Nonetheless, the basis for non-actionability of 
the unlawful means appears to be substantially similar. In the case of a 
criminal wrong, the plaintiff would not be entitled to sue in a civil 
action because he did not fall within the specific class of persons to be 
protected under the criminal statute. That is, the plaintiff ’s status did not 
entitle him to a private right of action under the statute. In a similar 
fashion, the plaintiff in the present case, due to his status as a non-
contracting party, was disentitled to sue in breach of contract. 
26.28 Further, it is clear that an unlawful means conspiracy can arise 
in connection with a breach of contract.29 By not requiring actionability 
of the unlawful means, the law of conspiracy is not treated as a species of 
joint torts. One implication flowing from this analysis is that the tort of 
conspiracy, with this dispensation of the actionability requirement, takes 
on a more expanded role in protecting the plaintiff ’s economic interests. 
Conversion 
26.29 The three cases on conversion concerned, among other things, 
the plaintiff ’s right to immediate possession. Two of the cases were in 
respect of the possession of shares and one was with respect to bunkers. 
In AAHG LLC v Hong Hin Kay Albert,30 the plaintiff company alleged 
that the defendant, Hong Hin Kay Albert, had wrongfully transferred 
                                                                        
27 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 452 at [120], citing Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Total 
Network SL [2008] 1 AC 1174; see also EFT Holdings Inc v Marinteknik 
Shipbuilders (S) Pte Ltd [2014] 1 SLR 860 at [91]. 
28 [2008] 1 AC 1174. 
29 See, eg, Nagase Singapore Pte Ltd v Ching Kai Huat [2008] 1 SLR(R) 80 at [23]; 
Monarch Beverage Company (Europe) Ltd v Kickapoo (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd [2009] 
SGHC 55 at [73] and [107]. 
30 [2017] 3 SLR 636. 
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shares in a company, Universal Medicare Pte Ltd (“Universal”), from 
another company, DVI, Inc (“DVI”), to himself and, thereafter, 
transferred shares to a third company, Columbia Asia Healthcare 
Sdn Bhd (“Columbia Asia”). The court observed that the plaintiff was 
the successor to DVI’s rights against the defendant. 
26.30 The defendant argued that he had transferred the shares 
pursuant to his right of pre-emption under the memorandum and 
articles of association of Universal. However, Art 30 required the person 
intending to transfer shares to give a “transfer notice” to the company. 
When DVI filed for reorganisation under ch 11 of the US Bankruptcy 
Code, the Delaware Bankruptcy Court authorised it to sell certain 
assets. There was a Notice of Sale issued by DVI that the sale of the 
shares was to Goldman Sachs (Asia) Finance (that is, GS Asia) pursuant 
to the order made by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court. Columbia Asia, 
subsequently, purchased the shares. Chua Lee Ming JC noted that this 
Notice of Sale did not constitute a “transfer notice” required under the 
Articles. Hence, the defendant had wrongfully procured the transfer of 
the shares. 
26.31 The next issue related to whether DVI had the right to 
immediate possession of the shares. As DVI was the registered holder of 
shares at the material time, it was prima facie entitled to immediate 
possession of the shares. The defendant, however, contended that the 
plaintiff had lost the right to immediate possession on the ground that 
the shares were pledged to other entities. According to Chua JC, the 
burden of proof was, therefore, on the defendant to show that the 
plaintiff had lost the right to immediate possession due to the pledge of 
shares. As the burden was not discharged by the defendant, the plaintiff 
was entitled to sue in conversion in respect of the shares. 
26.32 On the quantification of damages, the judge decided that the 
sale to Columbia Asia constituted the best available evidence of the 
value of shares since it was an arms-length negotiated transaction which 
took place at the time of the conversion. 
26.33 Even if the plaintiff did not have the right to sue in conversion, 
the learned judge concluded that the plaintiff suffered injury as the 
defendant’s wrongful act had deprived the plaintiff either temporarily or 
permanently of the benefit of his reversionary interest in the shares. The 
judge noted that the chances of recovering the shares from a third party, 
a company which was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice, 
was significantly reduced. Though the claim for reversionary damages 
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was a distinct cause of action from the tort of conversion,31 it was 
sufficiently pleaded. 
26.34 The case of Telemedia Pacific Group Ltd v Yuanta Asset 
Management International Ltd,32 involving conspiracy, conversion, 
breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary obligations was decided by 
Patricia Bergin, International Judge of the Singapore International 
Commercial Court. As part of a commercial joint venture, the defendant 
company agreed to advance loans to a special purpose vehicle, secured 
by shares. The defendant company also agreed to pledge shares provided 
by the plaintiff company as security for loans advanced to it. These loans 
were to be deposited into the accounts of the special purpose vehicle in 
order to fund the joint investments. 
26.35 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to defraud 
them and to conceal such fraud and the proceeds from them. The claim 
in conspiracy by unlawful means failed as the plaintiffs could not prove 
that the unlawful means – the express misrepresentations allegedly 
made to the plaintiff – were made. 
26.36 With respect to the claim for conversion of shares, the recovery 
of damages depended on whether the shares in question were pledged 
against a loan. For one set of shares, the shares were transferred to the 
defendant company which had provided a loan that was secured by 
pledged shares. Hence, the defendant company was entitled at its 
discretion to sell the shares and/or to re-deliver a cash equivalent to the 
plaintiffs on maturity. As the plaintiffs did not have immediate right to 
possession, their claim in conversion in respect of those shares failed. 
On the other hand, the plaintiffs’ claim in conversion in respect of 
another set of shares that were not pledged against a loan succeeded, for 
which they recovered damages. 
26.37 The case of The “Star Quest”33 reaffirmed that, for a claim based 
on conversion, one central issue was whether the plaintiffs (that is, 
appellants), who sold marine fuel oil (“bunkers”) to two buyers pursuant 
to contracts of sale, retained the immediate right to possession of the 
bunkers.34 In its application for summary judgment, the appellants 
argued that its right to immediate possession of the bunkers was 
premised on its status as the holder of certain bills of lading. This right, 
                                                                        
31 Multi-Pak Singapore Pte Ltd v Intraco Ltd [1992] 2 SLR(R) 382 at [30]–[31]; 
Multistar Holdings Ltd v Geocon Piling & Engineering Pte Ltd [2016] 2 SLR 1 
at [34]. 
32 [2016] 5 SLR 1. 
33 [2016] 3 SLR 1280. 
34 The Cherry [2003] 1 SLR(R) 471 at [62]; East West Corp v DKBS 1912 [2003] 
1 Lloyd’s Rep 239 at [69]. 
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according to the court, depended on the intentions of the parties to the 
underlying sale contracts which were to be objectively ascertained from 
their terms. In this case, the possessory interest had passed under the 
contracts to the buyers upon loading. The defendants (respondents), as 
the owners and/or demise charterers of the vessels on which the bunkers 
were loaded were, thus, held unconditionally entitled to defend the 
appellant’s claim for conversion. 
Defamation 
26.38 Several interesting issues on the tort of defamation have arisen 
during the period of review including the following: 
(a) whether an allegation concerning lawsuits initiated 
against the plaintiff but which have not been determined by the 
court is defamatory; 
(b) whether an allegation about the plaintiff ’s sexual 
orientation is defamatory; 
(c) the factors for ascertaining the foreign corporate 
plaintiff ’s reputation within the jurisdiction; 
(d) whether a pre-emptive response to a verbal attack may 
be protected by privilege; 
(e) whether police reports and complaints to statutory 
bodies may be protected by absolute or, alternatively, qualified 
privilege; and 
(f) verifiable facts and what qualifies as a comment for the 
purpose of the defence of fair comment. 
26.39 The background facts in The Wellness Group relating to 
conspiracy were described in paras 26.20–26.25 above. The OSIM Board 
published an announcement about the suit in conspiracy by the first and 
second plaintiffs (“OSIM Announcement”), stating its view that the suit 
was unmeritorious and groundless. TWG and Manoj sued OSIM in 
defamation in respect of the OSIM Announcement. 
26.40 Later, The Straits Times published an article about the case 
which contained the following two paragraphs (“ST Offending Words”):35 
[TWG] said in a separate statement on Monday that ‘the other 
shareholders and directors of TWG Tea have conspired to injure the 
interests of [TWG] by diluting its shareholdings in TWG Tea and 
enabling OSIM to take control over TWG Tea’ 
                                                                        
35 The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [221]. 
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… 
[Manoj] also alleges that OSIM, [Ron Sim] and [Taha] conspired to 
remove him as TWG Tea chief executive, even as a shareholders’ 
agreement implied that he would stay in the position for five years 
from March 24, 2011. 
The Straits Times article was based on a press statement by TWG, the 
writ of summons and statement of claim in the conspiracy action 
(“Original Publication”). OSIM counterclaimed against TWG and 
Manoj for the ST Offending words. 
26.41 Both the claim and counterclaim in defamation were dismissed. 
With respect to the counterclaim, the question was whether TWG and 
Manoj were responsible for the republication by The Straits Times. TWG 
and Manoj argued that the second paragraph in the ST Offending Words 
was not a repetition of the relevant part of the Original Publication but 
were The Straits Times’ own words. In response, Chua JC stated that 
where the republisher uses language that is his own, the defendant who 
can be said to have authorised the republication will remain liable so 
long as the republication adheres to the sense and substance of the 
statement given by the defendant. 
26.42 With respect to the requirement of defamatory meaning, the 
learned judge held that the ST Offending Words were not defamatory. 
Read in the context of the whole article, an ordinary reasonable reader 
of the Straits Times article, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, 
using his general knowledge and common sense, would understand the 
ST Offending Words to refer to a dispute before the court between the 
parties. A reasonable reader would understand that the allegations in the 
dispute remain to be proved in court. In this regard, Chua JC cited two 
cases36 for the proposition that a publication understood to mean that a 
dispute is before the court and that the allegations in the dispute remain 
to be determined is not defamatory. In Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS 
Automation Pte Ltd,37 the letter sent by the plaintiff company stating that 
it was commencing a legal action for breach of confidence against the 
defendant and that the defendant had made a product for a third party 
that contained the confidential information was held, on the whole, not 
defamatory. In Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & 
Sons Ltd,38 the allegations contained in the pleadings, which concerned a 
                                                                        
36 The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [240], 
citing Ross McConnel Kitchen & Co Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd [1980] 
2 NSWLR 845 at [25]; Invenpro (M) Sdn Bhd v JCS Automation Pte Ltd [2014] 
2 SLR 1045 at [230]. 
37 [2014] 2 SLR 1045. 
38 [1980] 2 NSWLR 845. 
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conspiracy to cheat and defraud that had not been determined by the 
court, were also not defamatory. 
26.43 A comparison may be made with allegations involving criminal 
offences that have not been determined by the court in light of the 
English cases in Rubber Improvement v Daily Telegraph Ltd39 and Chase v 
News Group Newspapers Ltd.40 Allegations imputing: reasonable grounds 
to suspect that the plaintiff committed a serious offence such as murder; 
or grounds for investigating whether the plaintiff was responsible for the 
act were held to be defamatory. It appears that the courts are generally 
more circumspect in imputing defamatory meaning in respect of 
allegations concerning civil as compared to criminal wrongdoings 
though the precise facts and contexts in which the allegations were 
made will have to be examined. 
26.44 It is clear that the publication by a party of allegedly defamatory 
statements in order to repel an attack by another will be protected by the 
defence of qualified privilege if the publication: is relevant and made 
bona fide;41 is necessary for protecting the first party’s interests; 
constitutes a proportionate response to the attack;42 and is made to the 
audience with an interest to receive the communication in question.43 In 
the present case, TWG and Manoj argued that the same privilege should 
extend to “a pre-emptive press release in response to an anticipated 
attack”, citing Bhatt v Chelsea and Westminster NHS Trust.44 
26.45 Chua JC agreed, stating that a pre-emptive reply ought to be 
protected by qualified privilege provided the reply is in reasonable 
anticipation of an imminent attack and is a proportionate rebuttal.45 
This extension of the law comes with qualifications that are largely 
consistent with the approach for assessing the defendant’s responses to 
actual attacks by the plaintiff. It also accords with the general objective 
of qualified privilege in protecting the defendant’s interests. The learned 
judge opined that “[i]f the purpose of the privilege is to protect a 
person’s legitimate interest in defending his reputation, it seems 
unrealistic to require that person to wait until his character is actually 
attacked before making the rebuttal”. On the facts, however, his Honour 
                                                                        
39 [1964] AC 234. 
40 [2003] EMLR 218, applied in Ng Koo Kay Benedict v Zim Integrated Shipping 
Services Ltd [2010] 2 SLR 860. 
41 Lee Kuan Yew v Davies Derek Gwyn [1989] 2 SLR(R) 544. 
42 Tan Chor Chuan v Tan Yeow Hiang Kenneth [2006] 1 SLR(R) 16. 
43 Oei Hong Leong v Ban Song Long David [2005] 3 SLR(R) 608. 
44 16 October 1997 at p 7, cited in The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM 
International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [247]. 
45 See dicta in Bento v The Chief Constable of Bedfordshire Police [2012] EWHC 1525 
(QB) at [104]. 
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found that the press statement by TWG exceeded all proportionality 
necessary for the defence of qualified privilege. 
26.46 With regard to the main claim in defamation by TWG and 
Manoj against OSIM, this was based on the OSIM Announcement 
(“OSIM Offending Words”):46 
… The Board believes that the allegations [in S187/2014] are 
unmeritorious and groundless, and hence, [OSIM] intends to 
vigorously defend the Claim and is currently seeking legal advice to 
refute the Claim as well as to file Counterclaim against [TWG] and 
Manoj. 
The plaintiffs alleged that the words in the OSIM Announcement meant 
that the plaintiffs’ case was so bad that the plaintiffs must have acted 
dishonestly and in bad faith, and/or for an improper/ulterior purpose in 
commencing the suit. Chua JC was, however, of the view that an 
ordinary reasonable person would understand the OSIM Offending 
Words to mean nothing more than that the OSIM Board believed:47 
… the plaintiffs in [the suit] did not have a good case or that the 
plaintiffs’ case was unfounded, [and] OSIM, therefore, intended to 
defend the claim vigorously; … the OSIM Board believed OSIM may 
have a counterclaim against the plaintiffs; and … it was seeking legal 
advice on its defence and counterclaim. 
26.47 With respect to the defence of fair comment, the plaintiffs 
argued, citing Hamilton v Clifford48 (“Hamilton”) that “one is not 
permitted to seek shelter behind a defence of fair comment when the 
defamatory sting is one of verifiable fact.” The English High Court held 
that the statement that there are “grounds to suspect” is one of fact 
rather than comment.49 However, Chua JC distinguished Hamilton, 
stating that until the plaintiffs’ allegations have been finally determined 
by a court, any view expressed on the merits of those allegations must 
necessarily be an expression of an opinion. Hence, at the time that the 
OSIM Announcement was made, it was not objectively verifiable 
whether the allegations were unmeritorious and groundless. Chua JC, 
therefore, held that the statement in question qualified as a comment. 
26.48 Given the words “the Board believes” and the qualitative nature 
of the phrase “unmeritorious and groundless” without reference to 
                                                                        
46 The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [254]. 
47 The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [259]. 
48 [2004] EWHC 1542 (QB) at [60], cited in The Wellness Group Pte Ltd v OSIM 
International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [281]. 
49 Hamilton v Clifford [2004] EWHC 1542 (QB) at [62], cited in The Wellness Group 
Pte Ltd v OSIM International Ltd [2016] 3 SLR 729 at [283]. 
© 2017 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
  
(2016) 17 SAL Ann Rev Tort Law 671 
 
further facts, we agree that the OSIM Offending Words would amount 
to a comment. That said, Chua JC’s statement – any view expressed on 
the merits of allegations before they have been finally determined by a 
court must necessarily be an expression of an opinion – is arguably too 
broad. It is quite conceivable for an allegation, which remains to be 
determined by the court, to be objectively verifiable in nature. The 
allegation that a suit is unmeritorious and groundless may be proven 
false by, for instance, the presence of relevant facts satisfying the specific 
elements of the cause of action (for example, conspiracy). Conversely, 
the allegations will be verified should there be no facts that go towards 
satisfying the elements of the cause of action. 
26.49 Ultimately, the defence of comment failed. Though the OSIM 
Offending Words were comments touching on a matter of public 
interest, the defendants failed to prove that the comments were based on 
facts. There was no reference in the allegations to any facts that might 
suggest the allegations were unmeritorious and groundless. Neither were 
the comments fair. An honest fair-minded person could not honestly 
hold an opinion that the plaintiffs’ allegations in the suit were 
unmeritorious and groundless, based on the supporting facts pleaded by 
the defendants. 
26.50 The question of privilege to be extended to protect defamatory 
statements contained in police reports and complaints to statutory 
bodies was addressed in Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd v 
A L Dakshnamoorthy.50 The defendant was the representative of the 
owners of certain properties who had appointed Isabel Redrup Agency 
Pte Ltd (“Redrup”), the plaintiff company, as their property agent. There 
was a dispute over the commissions between Susan, Redrup’s managing 
director, and the defendant. The defamation suit arose from the 
defendant’s actions in lodging a police report as well as a complaint with 
the Council of Estate Agencies (“CEA Complaint”) concerning the 
possibility that its property agent Susan had forged a draft option 
agreement. The police report and CEA Complaint were later sent to a 
member of the press. Redrup and Susan claimed in defamation. Susan 
alleged that the contents of the police report, the CEA Complaint and 
the letter to the press were defamatory as follows:51 
(a) Susan had behaved unethically in her capacity as a property 
agent and/or as the key executive officer of Isabel Redrup by 
committing forgery (“Allegation 1”). 
                                                                        
50 [2016] 2 SLR 634. 
51 Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd v A L Dakshnamoorthy [2016] 2 SLR 634 at [32]. 
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(b) Isabel Redrup is dishonest and/or unfit to carry out the 
business of real estate agency because it improperly allowed or is 
vicariously liable for the alleged forgery (“Allegation 2”). 
According to the court, the defamatory sting of the police report and the 
CEA Complaint was that there were reasonable grounds to suspect that 
the property agent forged a draft option rather than an imputation of 
unethical and dishonest behaviour. But the statements were not 
defamatory of Redrup, which was an entity separate from the individual 
agent. As there were no reasonable grounds to suspect that Susan had 
forged a draft option agreement with a dishonest or fraudulent intent, 
the defence of justification was not made out. 
26.51 One controversial issue was whether the Police Report and the 
CEA Complaint should be protected by absolute privilege. Lee Seiu 
Kin J decided in the negative. His Honour reasoned that the aim of 
facilitating the effective discharge of the shared public duty in court 
proceedings – to ascertain the truth of the matter – is distinct from the 
public duty that is exercised by investigators, which is to decide whether 
the circumstances warrant the institution of proceedings to ascertain the 
truth of the matter. 
26.52 Hence, the police report and the CEA Complaint were made on 
occasions of qualified, not absolute privilege. People who come forward 
to assist in addressing a wrong are under a civic duty and the police are 
under a corresponding duty to investigate such leads. Complaints to a 
statutory board governing the licensing and registration of estate agents 
are sufficiently analogous to statements made to the police to warrant 
the protection of qualified privilege. The defendant was not, however, 
entitled to the defence of qualified privilege in relation to the 
publication of the Police Report and the CEA Complaint to the member 
of the press. 
26.53 The defendant defamed the property agent with the knowledge 
that those allegations were untrue, and probably with the motive of 
depriving her of her commission. This amounted to malice, which 
defeated the defence of qualified privilege. But this did not extend to the 
acts of the owners in authorising the defendant to act for them in the 
property transaction. The property agent recovered damages in the sum 
of S$30,000 in respect of the complaint and the police report. As for the 
publication of these materials to a member of the press, damages in the 
sum of S$10,000 were awarded. 
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26.54 On 10 February 2017, the Court of Appeal in Goh Lay Khim v 
Isabel Redrup Agency Pte Ltd52 dismissed the appeal against the High 
Court’s decision. 
26.55 Randall Savio Anthony D’Souza v Pius Chai53 concerned actions 
in both defamation and harassment. The plaintiff and the defendant 
were ex-colleagues at a company. The plaintiff sued the defendant for 
the latter’s statements to his superiors that he had been sexually harassed 
and bullied by the plaintiff at the workplace. In particular, the plaintiff 
alleged that the offending words, in their natural and ordinary 
meanings, meant and were understood to mean that: “the Plaintiff [was] 
gay or a bisexual or [had] sexual inclinations or predispositions towards 
the Defendant”; and “the Plaintiff had behaved inappropriately and 
improperly towards the Defendant at the workplace”.54 The learned 
judge held that the offending words “with their sexual connotations and 
calling into question the Plaintiff ’s professionalism” were defamatory as 
they tended to lower the plaintiff ’s reputation in the estimation of  
right-thinking members of society. 
26.56 It is important to note that cases in Australia,55 Scotland,56 and 
New York state in the US57 have held that allegations that the plaintiff is 
a homosexual are not defamatory. These decisions are arguably 
influenced by the more liberal legislation and attitudes relating to 
homosexuality, anti-discrimination law relating to sexual orientation, 
and the recognition of civil partnerships (for example, the UK Civil 
Partnership Act 2004). 
26.57 Other courts in Australia, for instance, have taken a contrary 
view.58 For the view that the “Singapore position presents a unique 
model in transition” based on the existing s 377A of the Penal Code,59 
which criminalises homosexuality between consenting males.60 This 
observation was premised on official government policy not to enforce 
the provision and associated statements proactively as well as two 
pending judicial review cases as at 2013 on the constitutionality of 
                                                                        
52 [2017] 1 SLR 546. 
53 [2016] SGDC 257. 
54 Randall Savio Anthony D’Souza v Pius Chai [2016] SGDC 257. 
55 See, eg, Rivkin v Amalgamated Television Services Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 432, 
per Bell J, Obermann v ACP Publishing Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 1022. 
56 See, eg, Quilty v Windsor [1999] SLT 346; Cowan v Bennett [2012] ScotSC 101, 
per Sheriff McGowan. 
57 See, eg, Yonaty v Mincolla 945 NYS 2d 774 (App Div, 2012). 
58 See, eg, John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Rivkin [2003] 201 ALR 77 at [140], 
per Kirby J; Kelly v John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd [2003] NSWSC 586. 
59 Cap 224, 2008 Rev Ed. 
60 See Gary K Y Chan, “Defamatory Meaning, Community Perspectives and 
Standards” (2014) 19 MALR 47 at 77. 
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s 377A and public surveys. Since then, the Singapore Court of Appeal 
has in the two judicial review cases, held that the constitutionality of 
s 377A should be preserved.61 This may have tilted the balance slightly in 
favour of the position that such allegations on homosexuality will likely 
be regarded as defamatory in Singapore. 
26.58 Though the offending words were held defamatory of the 
plaintiff, the defendant was entitled to rely on the defence of qualified 
privilege. The defendant claimed that he only informed his superiors of 
the incidents when he requested for an inter-office transfer, and was 
asked by his superiors to provide the reasons for his request. Qualified 
privilege existed based on the “common interest” and/or “duty interest” 
analysis. First, the employee had an interest in raising concerns 
regarding sexual harassment, and the employee’s supervisor also had an 
interest in receiving such communications. Secondly, when asked for his 
reasons for the transfer, the defendant was clearly under at least a social 
or moral duty to communicate his reasons, and the company had an 
interest in hearing these reasons to evaluate the request. Moreover, the 
defendant’s main motive in telling the company’s management about the 
incidents was merely to justify his request for a transfer, and not to 
injure the plaintiff, or for any improper purpose. The defendant was 
likely to have honestly believed that the plaintiff ’s alleged words and act 
did in fact occur, though the plaintiff might only have been joking 
with him. 
26.59 On justification, the court noted that the plaintiff had on a 
number of occasions tried to joke with the defendant by making 
references to the defendant’s butt, and had further on one occasion 
“crutched his crotch” in front of the defendant as part of a Michael 
Jackson impersonation, and this series of events had made the defendant 
very distressed and upset. According to the learned judge, those facts 
were insufficient to justify the imputation of the offending words, 
namely that the plaintiff was gay or bisexual and had committed sexual 
harassment and workplace bullying against the defendant. Whilst it is 
true that those facts could not justify the allegations relating to the 
plaintiff ’s sexual orientation, they are arguably sufficient to justify the 
allegations relating to workplace bullying. 
26.60 The defendant counterclaimed against the plaintiff under the 
common law on tort of harassment. This was because the alleged actions 
of the plaintiff took place before the enactment of the Protection from 
Harassment Act.62 The common law tort of harassment in Malcomson 
                                                                        
61 See Lim Meng Suang v Attorney-General [2015] 1 SLR 26. 
62 Cap 256A, 2015 Rev Ed. 
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Nicholas Hugh Bertram v Mehta Naresh Kumar63 and Tee Yok Kiat v Pang 
Min Seng64 has since been abolished under the statute. In any event, the 
elements of the tort were not made out on the facts of the case. 
26.61 Qingdao Bohai Construction Group Co Ltd v Goh Teck Beng65 
concerned the alleged dissemination of an online article and print news 
articles. The plaintiffs did not rely on electronic evidence to trace the 
publication of the online articles to the defendants but instead relied on 
inferences from circumstantial evidence. The defendants were not 
responsible for making the defamatory material available to a 
third party in a comprehensible form. The defamation action was 
dismissed as there was no real and substantial tort under the abuse of 
process doctrine established in Jameel (Yousef) v Dow Jones & Co Inc.66 
Belinda Ang Saw Ean J stated that there was no presumption of law that 
material appearing on the Internet had been published and it was, 
therefore, insufficient to simply allege that the defamatory material was 
posted on the Internet and was accessible in Singapore. 
26.62 The second reason for the dismissal of action was that the 
requirement that the corporate plaintiff had to prove it had a trading or 
business reputation within the jurisdiction at the material time of the 
alleged publication was not satisfied. A corporate plaintiff in defamation 
actions cannot be injured in its feelings, but only “injured in its 
pocket”.67 Unlike an individual, a corporate plaintiff is not presumed to 
have a reputation; instead, it must prove that it has a reputation that is 
capable of being injured by the alleged libel. 
26.63 The relevant factors for determining whether the corporate 
plaintiff had a trading or business reputation within the jurisdiction at 
the material time of the publication, to entitle it to an award of damages 
for libel, include: 
(a) … evidence of actual or intended clients, investors or 
competitors ([Atlantis World Group of Companies NV v Gruppo 
Editoriale L’Espresso SPA [2008] EWHC 1323 (QB)] at [49]); 
(b) knowledge of the existence of the foreign corporate plaintiff 
in the jurisdiction ([Multigroup Bulgaria Holding AD v Oxford 
Analytica Ltd [2001] EMLR 28 (“Multigroup”)] at [37]); 
                                                                        
63 [2001] 3 SLR(R) 379. 
64 [2013] SGCA 9. 
65 [2016] 4 SLR 977. 
66 [2005] QB 946. 
67 Basil Anthony Herman v Premier Security Co-operative Ltd [2010] 3 SLR 110 
at [65]; ATU v ATY [2015] 4 SLR 1159 at [28], both citing Rubber Improvement 
Ltd v Daily Telegraph Ltd [1964] AC 234 at 262. 
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(c) presence of international brand recognition in the 
jurisdiction ([Helen Marie Steel and David Morris v McDonald’s 
Corporation and McDonald’s Restaurants Ltd (31 March 1999) (CA) 
(Eng) (“McDonald’s”), per Pill and May LJJ and Keene J]); 
(d) similarity of commercial activity and trading identity with [a] 
related company in the jurisdiction (Multigroup at [40], [but see 
McDonald’s and Palace Films Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications 
Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1136] at [36]–[37]); and 
(e) the extent of management role by the foreign corporate 
plaintiff in the related company in the jurisdiction, as opposed to 
merely owning shares in them, for the alleged publication to be able to 
have damaged the plaintiff in the eyes of investors in the jurisdiction 
(Multigroup at [31]–[32]). 
26.64 On the facts, the first plaintiff was unable to show that it had a 
trading or business reputation within the jurisdiction at the time of 
publication. The conspiracy claim also failed as they were premised on 
the defendants having published the online articles and/or the news 
articles. As the court had found that the defendants were not responsible 
for the publication of both the online articles and the news articles, the 
claim in conspiracy also failed. 
26.65 In Ng Bee Choo @ Ng Catherine v Mary Hoe-Tan,68 the plaintiff 
was employed as a property manager responsible for all the strata titles 
managed by the employer company. The company was owned and 
managed by the first defendant. The second defendant was the office 
manager of the company and a licensed estate agent. There were three 
letters published by the first and/or second defendants which the 
District Court held to be defamatory. 
26.66 The first letter which was published by the first defendant on 
the company’s letterhead imputed that the plaintiff conducted herself 
unprofessionally and dishonestly and was not trustworthy. The second 
letter suggested that the plaintiff was a liar and was not trustworthy or 
reliable in that she had no integrity, no honesty, and no professionalism. 
Finally, the third letter imputed that there were reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the plaintiff was involved in the commission of an offence.69 
26.67 Though the second and third letters on the face of them were 
purportedly signed by the second defendant, the second defendant 
denied signing the letters. Instead, the first defendant admitted that she 
wrote the letters. The statement of claim was made against both the first 
and second defendants. The district judge noted that the second 
                                                                        
68 [2016] SGDC 260. 
69 Chase v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2003] EMLR 11. 
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defendant agreed to a system that was put in place by the first defendant 
in sending out letters bearing the second defendant’s name. In so doing, 
the learned judge opined, relying on the case of Lee Kuan Yew v Davies 
Derek Gwyn,70 that the second defendant had “relinquished all control” 
over the contents of the letters sent by the first defendant. The second 
defendant was “indifferent to the truth” or “reckless”.71 
26.68 The court awarded damages of S$15,000 against the first 
defendant and damages of S$8,000 against the second defendant. The 
district judge noted the principle laid down by the Court of Appeal in 
Goh Chok Tong v Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin72 that “courts should 
award one single lump sum as damages” [emphasis in original] 
compensating the plaintiff for the “collective actions of the defendant, 
from the date of publication to the end of trial” [emphasis in original] and 
that “an award for aggravated damages should not be separated from 
an award for general compensatory damages.” It should, however, be 
noted that: 
(a) the principle of awarding lump sum as damages from 
two or more defendants is subject to s 18 of the Defamation 
Act,73 which allows for separate assessment of damages for each 
defendant in circumstances where there is evidence of malice or 
any other matter of aggravation in respect of one defendant and 
not the other; and 
(b) the subsequent decisions in Basil Anthony Herman v 
Premier Security Co-operative Ltd74 and Lim Eng Hock Peter v 
Lin Jian Wei75 have advocated that courts should separate the 
basic amounts awarded for the defamation and the additional 
damages for the aggravation. 
26.69 The learned judge took the view that there were no aggravating 
factors to justify the award of aggravated damages despite the lack of 
remorse shown by the first defendant in the course of the trial and the 
intentional nature in the publication of the defamatory letters. Neither 
were the first defendant’s actions regarded as malicious on the ground 
that her dominant purpose in sending the letters was not to cause the 
plaintiff to lose the business. Apart from the question of the defendant’s 
dominant purpose, an enquiry into whether the first defendant lacked 
                                                                        
70 [1989] 2 SLR(R) 544. 
71 Ng Bee Choo @ Ng Catherine v Mary Hoe-Tan [2016] SGDC 260 at [86]. 
72 [1998] 2 SLR(R) 971 at [51], cited in Ng Bee Choo @ Ng Catherine v Mary Hoe-Tan 
[2016] SGDC 260 at [105]. 
73 Cap 75, 2014 Rev Ed. 
74 [2010] 3 SLR 110 at [65]. 
75 [2010] 4 SLR 357 at [40]. 
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belief in or was reckless as to the truth of the statement could have been 
undertaken to determine whether there was malice.76 
Malicious falsehood 
26.70 The decision in Allergan Inc v Ferlandz Nutra Pte Ltd77 raised 
the interesting issue of whether a statement made concerning the 
plaintiff should be interpreted as pertaining to its past (mis)conduct, 
thereby rendering the statement false, or whether it should be construed 
as part of continuing (mis)conduct. 
26.71 The plaintiffs, comprising an American company and its 
wholly-owned subsidiary company incorporated in Singapore, claimed 
against the defendant, a Singapore company that imported and 
distributed certain products, in trademark infringement, passing off, 
and malicious falsehood. The claim in malicious falsehood related to the 
distribution of a copy of a letter by the US Food & Drug Administration 
(“FDA Letter”) to the staff of Temasek Medical Center (“TMC”), 
a customer of the second plaintiff, in May 2012. The FDA Letter, dated 
10 September 2009, set out the FDA’s view that the first plaintiff ’s 
promotional materials and website in relation to a specific product were 
misleading, and it requested remedial action. 
26.72 The first plaintiff had complied with the FDA’s request. In order 
to establish falsehood, it alleged that the distribution constituted a 
statement that the first plaintiff ’s promotional materials continued to be 
misleading. On the other hand, the defendant argued that the 
distribution only meant that the first plaintiff ’s promotional materials 
were misleading at the date of the FDA Letter. George Wei J stated that 
“the proper inquiry is: what would a reasonable person in the position of 
TMC understand to be the meaning arising from the disclosure of the 
FDA Letter?”78 
26.73 Based on the evidence, the learned judge took the view that the 
reasonable person would only interpret the FDA Letter as “a record of 
the First Plaintiff ’s past brush with US law on misleading advertising, 
and not that the First Plaintiff is in continuing breach of the law”.79 
Hence, the FDA Letter did not give rise to a falsehood. The FDA Letter 
was dated more than two years before the distribution. The FDA Letter 
indicated that the first plaintiff ’s webpages were last accessed in 
                                                                        
76 Lim Eng Hock Peter v Lin Jian Wei [2010] 4 SLR 331. 
77 [2016] 4 SLR 919. 
78 Allergan Inc v Ferlandz Nutra Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 919 at [226]. 
79 Allergan Inc v Ferlandz Nutra Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 919 at [230]. 
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June 2009. The FDA Letter called for an immediate stop to the 
dissemination of the material. The first plaintiff, as a major 
pharmaceutical company with a US presence, was likely to treat an FDA 
request seriously, and it continued to market the product. 
Misrepresentation 
26.74 The respondent in ACTAtek Inc v Tembusu Growth Fund Ltd80 
had entered into two convertible loan agreements (“CLAs”) with the 
appellant, first in 2007 and then again in 2012 to lend money that would 
be repaid by the issuance of shares. Subsequently, the respondent 
declared an event of default under the 2012 CLA, alleging that the 
appellant had misused the moneys; this triggered an automatic cross-
default under the 2007 CLA. The respondent sued for recovery of the 
loans and brought an action in deceit, while the appellant countersued 
for wrongful declaration of default. The High Court found in favour of 
the respondent. The Court of Appeal allowed the appellant’s appeal, 
overturning the High Court’s finding on both deceit and the contractual 
claim. The court also allowed the appeal with respect to the 
counterclaim. The discussion here is limited to the deceit claim. 
26.75 Sundaresh Menon CJ, delivering the judgment of the court, 
began by applying the elements of the tort of deceit set out in Panatron 
Pte Ltd v Lee Cheow Lee81 to the facts: 
(a) The Appellants must have made a representation of fact 
by words or conduct. 
(b) The Appellants must have made the representation with 
the intention that Tembusu should act upon it. 
(c) Tembusu must have acted upon the representation. 
(d) The Appellants must have made the representation: 
(i) knowing that it is false; 
(ii) without any belief in its truth; or 
(iii) recklessly, without regard to whether it is true 
or not. 
(e) Tembusu must have suffered damage by acting upon 
the misrepresentation. 
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26.76 There were two statements alleged to give rise to the tort. The 
first statement, made in October 2011, was that ACTAtek “required 
funds to invest in ‘inventory’ and ‘sales/marketing’ in order to take full 
advantage of the opportunity to work with [a target company]”. 
Menon CJ held that this statement could not be construed as a 
representation of fact as to the appellant’s intention as it was made even 
before negotiations had commenced. The second statement, made in 
December 2011, represented that the funds would be used for certain 
purposes only. The respondents alleged that the funds were used for  
a different purpose. Menon CJ held that this statement was a 
representation of fact as to the intention of the parties and could be the 
basis of an action in deceit, if it were made fraudulently. On the 
evidence, the appellant had made this statement believing that payment 
of salaries was one of the legitimate purposes of the funds. As such, the 
representation was not made with the knowledge or belief that it was 
false, and hence the action failed. 
26.77 Heinrich Pte Ltd v Lau Kim Huat82 involved a lawsuit between 
two former business partners who had a falling out. The defendant was 
the director of the second plaintiff (Heinrich Pte Ltd) in which the first 
plaintiff had a controlling interest. The defendant left the plaintiffs to 
establish his own business, following which the plaintiffs sued him for 
breach of a joint venture agreement, breach of duty of care, and 
misrepresentation. Abdullah JC dismissed all the claims for lack of 
evidence. The case did not raise any novel or controversial legal point. 
26.78 The plaintiff in Ong Ghee Soon Kevin v Ho Yong Chong83 was a 
Malaysian citizen who was a banking customer of a Singaporean branch 
of a Swiss bank. The defendant was an employee of the bank. The 
plaintiff lost US$655,000 purchasing shares in a company that eventually 
became worthless. He sued the defendant, alleging negligent 
misrepresentation. There was an issue of private international law 
pertaining to Swiss law, which will not be dealt with here. Ang J 
dismissed the plaintiff ’s claim on the basis that he had failed to prove 
that the alleged representation even took place. 
Negligence 
26.79 The plaintiff and defendant in Te Deum Engineering Pte Ltd v 
Grace Electrical Engineering Pte Ltd84 occupied adjoining units in a 
single-storey terrace block. A fire broke out, damaging both properties. 
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The plaintiff sued, alleged that the fire had started in the defendant’s 
unit and spread to the plaintiff ’s unit. The defendant denied this and 
countersued, alleging that the fire had started in the plaintiff ’s unit. 
Prior to this action, the defendant had pleaded guilty to charges under 
the Fire Safety Act85 and accepted that the fire had started on its 
premises, contrary to its subsequent denial in the civil action. 
26.80 Ang J found on the evidence that the fire had started in the 
defendant’s premises. Having made that determination, Ang J applied 
the res ipsa loquitur maxim to find the defendant negligent as the 
premises were in the defendant’s control, there was no explanation for 
the cause of the fire and it would not have occurred but for some 
negligence. 
26.81 Estate of Lee Rui Feng Dominique Sarron, deceased v Najib 
Hanuk bin Muhammad Jalal86 was a tragic case involving the death of a 
National Serviceman during training. The deceased, who was asthmatic, 
suffered breathing problems during an exercise in which smoke 
canisters were discharged. He, subsequently, died due to an acute 
allergic reaction to a particular chemical in the smoke. The deceased’s 
estate (plaintiff) sued the platoon commander (first defendant) and the 
chief safety officer (second defendant) in negligence as well as the 
attorney-general (“AG”) for alleged breach of contract. 
26.82 The particulars of negligence alleged against the first defendant 
included: failure to comply with the Training Safety Regulations 
(“TSR”); failure to consider the deceased’s asthmatic condition, and 
detonation of six smoke grenades rather than two as stated in the TSR. 
Similar allegations were made against the second defendant in addition 
to allegations of failure to prepare for adequate and timely medical 
intervention. A committee of inquiry (“COI”) convened by the Armed 
Forces Council found the first defendant negligent in using more than 
two smoke grenades and further opined that the increased amount of 
smoke had increased the risk of the adverse reaction that resulted in 
death. 
26.83 The two defendants and the AG applied to strike out the action. 
Ramesh JC granted the application by the two defendants on the ground 
that s 14 of the Government Proceedings Act87 (“GPA”) provided 
immunity against suit. The AG’s application was granted on the ground 
that there was no contract of service between the deceased and the 
Singapore Armed Forces (“SAF”). This section deals only with the tort 
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claim. The COI findings suggested that the first defendant had been 
negligent and that his negligence had caused the death of the deceased. 
The issue for the High Court was whether the GPA provided immunity 
both for the Government and for the two defendants. 
26.84 Ramesh JC noted that s 14 of the GPA has its roots in s 10 of the 
UK Crown Proceedings Act 194788 (“1947 UK Act”). The 1947 UK Act 
abolished the immunity of the Crown but, by s 10, retained the 
immunity for the armed forces to enable the armed forces to carry out 
their duties and training without fear of litigation. This was the same 
justification offered for s 14 of the GPA when it was debated in the 
Parliament. Section 10 of the 1947 UK Act was, however, repealed by the 
UK Crown Proceedings (Armed Forces) Act 198789 and replaced with a 
much more limited immunity, which Ramesh JC noted is not the case in 
Singapore. Thus, while the 1947 UK Act is relevant to the interpretation 
of the Singapore legislation, it bears noting that the UK has moved away 
from its own earlier position and provided greater protection for its 
servicemen by restricting Crown immunity. 
26.85 A proviso to s 14(1) stated that the immunity will not apply to 
acts or omissions that are not connected with the execution of duties as 
a member of SAF. The plaintiff argued that the first defendant’s flagrant 
breach of the TSR by detonating six, instead of two, canisters meant that 
his actions were not in connection with the execution of his duties. 
Ramesh JC rejected this argument on the ground that the first 
defendant’s actions were not intentional but merely negligent, and the 
point of the immunity was to protect individuals and the Government 
from liability for tortious conduct. Holding that the immunity applied, 
Ramesh JC struck out the claim. 
Professional negligence 
26.86 The appellant in Ramesh s/o Krishnan v AXA Life Insurance 
Singapore Pte Ltd90 was a senior financial services director with AXA 
Life Insurance, the respondent. His relationship with the group soured 
and he left, following which he applied to join Prudential Assurance 
Company Singapore Pte Ltd (“Prudential”), failing which, he applied to 
join Tokio Marine Life Insurance Singapore Limited (“Tokio Marine”). 
The regulatory framework of the financial advisory and insurance 
industry required a reference to be provided by the previous employer. 
Prudential sought a reference, which the respondent provided, in which 
it highlighted the appellant’s apparent poor record in terms of 
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persistency ratios and ethical conduct. Prudential eventually decided 
not to hire the appellant. The appellant’s application to Tokio Marine 
met the same fate. The appellant sued the respondent for defamation, 
malicious falsehood, and negligence. 
26.87 All three claims failed in the High Court. For the negligence 
action, the High Court held that a duty was owed, but not breached and 
that, in any case, it was not shown that the respondent’s reference had 
caused the appellant’s loss of employment. The appellant appealed 
against the decision with respect to negligence. The Court of Appeal 
allowed the appeal and gave detailed guidance on how to determine the 
standard of care and breach thereof in negligence. 
26.88 The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant was hired by the 
respondent and promoted, indicating that he was a good performer. At 
some point, the appellant was assured that his performance would be 
evaluated on his persistency ratio for regular premiums and not for 
single premiums. As a result, the appellant focused his energies on 
selling regular premium products. Following a management change, the 
appellant was informed that his, and his team’s, performance would be 
evaluated on the basis of both types of premiums. This caused 
unhappiness and led to a breakdown in the relationship, culminating in 
the appellant leaving the respondent. 
26.89 Menon CJ, delivering the judgment of the court, affirmed that a 
duty of care exists in this type of cases, applying Spring v Guardian 
Assurance plc91 (“Spring”) and Spandeck Engineering (S) Pte Ltd v 
Defence Science & Technology Agency92 (“Spandeck”). Menon CJ then 
gave a detailed analysis of the standard of care applicable to employers 
providing references for their former employees. Following a 
comprehensive review of the English authorities, Menon CJ set out the 
applicable principles in Singapore, reproduced below for convenience:93 
(a) The employer must exercise reasonable care to ensure that: 
(i) the facts stated in the reference are true; and (ii) any opinions 
expressed there are based on, and supported by, facts which are true 
… 
(b) The employer must also exercise reasonable care to ensure 
that the reference does not give an unfair or misleading overall 
impression of the employee, even if the discrete pieces of information 
which it contains are factually correct. In other words, due care must 
                                                                        
91 [1995] 2 AC 296. 
92 [2007] 4 SLR(R) 100. 
93 Ramesh s/o Krishnan v AXA Life Insurance Singapore Pte Ltd [2016] 4 SLR 1124 
at [102]. 
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be taken to ensure that the reference is not only true, but also accurate 
in the sense of not being misleading or unfair … 
(c) The employer is required to exercise reasonable care to 
disclose any information that relates to information which has already 
been provided, where to withhold such further information would 
render the information that has been disclosed incomplete, inaccurate 
or unfair … 
(d) Subject to the foregoing qualifications, the employer is not 
required to give a full and comprehensive reference or to include all 
material facts about the employee in the reference … 
(e) In general, the employer should not include in the reference, 
whether explicitly or implicitly, complaints or other allegations against 
the employee that the latter had no knowledge of and had not been 
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself against … 
(f) In assessing what constitutes reasonable care, regard will be 
had to the gravity of any adverse suggestion or inference contained in 
the reference … 
[emphasis in original] 
26.90 Menon CJ justified the standard of care on the basis that the 
employee was at risk of significant harm; there was an inherent risk that 
an employer might wish to discredit an employee who sought to join a 
rival; and the employee was typically unable to protect his own interest. 
Turning to the facts, Menon CJ noted that there were three particulars 
of negligence, respectively pertaining to the persistency ratios, 
compliance issues, and ethical violations. On the first, Menon CJ found 
that the respondent was negligent in using a 13-month period to 
determine the persistency ratio instead of the standard 19-month 
period. The 13-month period, although factually accurate, provided a 
misleading picture of the appellant’s persistency ratio, suggesting he was 
less successful. The respondent’s negligence was compounded by its 
failure to respond to repeated inquiries from Prudential for clarification, 
as the appellant separately had provided Prudential with the 19-month 
figures. 
26.91 Similarly, Menon CJ found that the respondent had misled 
Prudential in its statements on compliance issues, suggesting that there 
were serious problems when in fact it was only some members of the 
appellant’s team that had been investigated and found guilty of 
compliance breaches. Finally, the information on alleged ethical 
violations was also inaccurate and, indeed, the tone of the 
communication suggested that the respondent had deliberately 
exaggerated some of the facts and made unfair insinuations. 
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26.92 On causation, Menon CJ reiterated that the approach was a 
commonsensical one. Referring to Lord Lowry in Spring,94 Menon CJ 
held that in cases of negligent references, all the plaintiff has to show is 
that the defendant’s negligent reference caused him to lose a reasonable 
chance of employment, not that the plaintiff would have been employed 
but for the defendant’s negligence. Causation was made out as 
Prudential had refused to hire the appellant due to the delays caused by 
the respondent. 
26.93 The defendants in Nava Bharat (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Straits Law 
Practice LLC,95 were a law firm (first defendant) and its senior director 
(second defendant), who were sued by their client, the plaintiff, for 
professional negligence. Briefly, the case involved transnational 
investment, and the alleged negligence, which was the sole issue in the 
Court of Appeal, was the failure of the second defendant to check with 
the Indonesian lawyers as to the enforceability of an oral undertaking 
made by the counterparty on which the plaintiff relied.96 
26.94 Menon CJ, delivering an ex tempore judgment, found the 
defendants not negligent, holding that the precise duty in question had 
to be identified, and that it was not sufficient to assert a broad duty to 
advise. This approach may be contrasted with the Court of Appeal’s 
approach in Go Dante Yap v Bank Austria Creditanstalt AG,97 where 
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA argued that tortious duties should not be 
too specific. Instead of describing the duty in Go Dante Yap as one to 
advise, Phang JA described it as “a broad duty to take such care as [was] 
reasonable in the circumstances”,98 leaving the more specific issue of 
what the defendant should have done to be discussed under the rubric 
of breach of duty. 
Medical negligence 
26.95 Koo Quay Keong v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien99 was a medical 
negligence case in which a patient who underwent Whipple surgery 
passed away following post-operative complications. The estate 
(plaintiff) brought an action in negligence against the defendant 
surgeon, alleging that the defendant failed to provide timely and 
                                                                        
94 Spring v Guardian Assurance plc [1995] 2 AC 296 at 327. 
95 [2016] 2 SLR 928. 
96 See (2015) 16 SAL Ann Rev 632 at 657–658, paras 26.60–26.62 for the full facts 
discussed in Nava Bharat (Singapore) Pte Ltd v Straits Law Practice LLC [2015] 
SGHC 146. 
97 [2011] 4 SLR 559. 
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appropriate care between the Whipple surgery and two subsequent 
surgeries. Initially, the plaintiff had also alleged negligent failure to 
inform and negligent performance of the surgery, but dropped these two 
allegations as the trial commenced. 
26.96 Reduced to its essentials, the particulars of negligence were that 
the defendant had failed to order CT scans to detect any possible 
anastomotic leaks and had been negligent in ordering liquid feeds, 
which potentially exacerbated the situation. Woo Bih Li J reaffirmed the 
Bolam/Bolitho100 test for medical negligence in Singapore as stated in 
Khoo James v Gunapathy d/o Muniandy101 (“Gunapathy”) and reiterated 
two key propositions. A doctor could endorse a practice as proper even 
if he would have adopted a different approach102 and diagnostic tests 
need not be ordered unless the plaintiff could prove a medical basis for 
them.103 
26.97 Applying the law to the facts, Woo J found that the defendant 
had not been negligent in failing to order the CT scans or in permitting 
oral feeds. Even if there had been negligence in failing to order a scan, 
the plaintiff would have failed to prove causation as there was no 
evidence to suggest that the proposed intervention (percutaneous 
drainage) to remove the fluids could have been performed in light of the 
plaintiff ’s condition. On the oral feeds, Woo J preferred the defendant’s 
expert view that this course of action was not negligent. 
26.98 Hii Chii Kok v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien104 (“Hii Chii Kok”) is 
an important decision on medical negligence as it was the first local 
decision on medical negligence to consider two landmark decisions of 
the UK Supreme Court: Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association105 
(“Woodland”) on non-delegable duties and Montgomery v Lanarkshire 
Health Board106 (“Montgomery”), which overruled Sidaway v Board of 
Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital107 (“Sidaway”) on the duty to 
inform. Hii Chii Kok has been appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
                                                                        
100 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582; Bolitho v City 
and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232. 
101 [2002] 1 SLR(R) 1024. 
102 Koo Quay Keong v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [2016] 5 SLR 130, citing 
D’Conceicao Jeanie Doris v Tong Ming Chuan [2011] SGHC 193. 
103 Koo Quay Keong v Ooi Peng Jin London Lucien [2016] 5 SLR 130, citing 
Chua Thong Jiang Andrew v Yue Wai Mun [2015] SGHC 119. 
104 [2016] 2 SLR 544. 
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26.99 The plaintiff, a Malaysian, had been diagnosed in Malaysia with 
neuroendocrine tumours (“NETs”) of the lung and was referred to the 
second defendant, the National Cancer Centre of Singapore (“NCCS”). 
NCCS diagnosed him as suffering from pancreatic NETs (“PNETs”) and 
noted the possibility that he could, alternatively, be suffering from a rare, 
but less serious condition, known as pancreatic polypeptide hyperplasia 
(“hyperplasia”). The consensus opinion of the experts, accepted by the 
court, was that a definitive diagnosis could only be made through post-
operative histopathology. 
26.100 The plaintiff, informed of the diagnosis of PNETs and the 
alternative possibility of hyperplasia, was advised that he could wait for 
six months for a further scan or undergo surgery. He was referred to a 
consultant surgeon, the first defendant, who advised that a procedure 
known as Whipple Surgery could resolve the problem. The plaintiff 
consented to this procedure, which was carried out at the Singapore 
General Hospital (“SGH”). The post-operative histopathology showed 
that the plaintiff suffered from hyperplasia rather than PNETs. Two 
weeks after being discharged, the plaintiff vomited blood and 
underwent further remedial surgery to remove portions of his pancreas 
and spleen. The plaintiff, suffering adverse effects from the remedial 
procedures necessitated by the complications arising out of the Whipple 
Surgery, sued the first and second defendants. The particular allegations 
included the following: 
(a) The first defendant owed a non-delegable duty in 
relation to the Whipple Surgery and post-operative care. 
(b) Both defendants were negligent in diagnosing the 
plaintiff. 
(c) Both defendants were negligent in the advice rendered. 
(d) The first defendant was negligent in the post-operative 
care. 
26.101 Chan Seng Onn J, in a detailed judgment found against the 
plaintiff on all the allegations. Referring to the Woodland principles, set 
out below at paras 26.162–26.163 and the English Court of Appeal 
decision of Farraj v King’s Healthcare NHS Trust,108 Chan J held that a 
hospital can be held to owe a non-delegable duty to its patients. On the 
facts of the particular case, Chan J held that the plaintiff was not in the 
care, custody, or control of NCCS nor did NCCS assume responsibility 
for the surgery or post-operative care, both of which were undertaken 
by the first defendant at SGH. Further, the plaintiff had control over 
who would perform the surgery, and was not obliged to select the first 
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defendant. As such, the Woodland requirements were not satisfied. 
Further, Chan J noted that it would not be fair and just to hold NCCS 
liable for the outcome of a surgery performed at another institution 
simply because it was performed by a surgeon it had recommended. 
26.102 NCCS’s responsibility was limited to the pre-operative diagnosis 
and advice. Interestingly, as an aside, Chan J held that NCCS could be 
held vicariously liable for the first defendant’s negligence in so far as  
it pertained to any service provided on behalf of NCCS during the  
pre-operative period. This raises some fairly important questions as to 
when an institution may be held vicariously for the torts of an 
independent contractor. Presumably, the first defendant was not an 
employee of NCCS as, otherwise, NCCS would have been vicariously 
liable for the surgery and post-operative care. The extent of a hospital’s 
vicarious liability in a complex healthcare system is a matter that 
deserves attention. 
26.103 Chan J reiterated that the test for medical negligence had been 
authoritatively stated in Gunapathy, endorsing the Bolam/Bolitho 
approach. Noting that the evidence of the defendant’s expert witness was 
logical and defensible, Chan J found the first defendant not negligent in 
his post-operative care. On the duty to advise, Chan J considered the 
recent UK Supreme Court decision of Montgomery, which had 
overruled Sidaway and rejected the Bolam test with respect to the duty 
to inform on the ground that the doctor–patient relationship has 
evolved with patient autonomy assuming a more significant role. Under 
the Gunapathy test, a doctor is required to disclose risks that a 
reasonable doctor considers material; under the Montgomery test, a 
doctor is required to disclose risks that a reasonable patient considers 
material, or risks which the doctor knows or ought to know that the 
particular patient will consider material. 
26.104 Referring to earlier High Court decisions applying Gunapathy 
to the duty to inform, Chan J noted that whether Singapore should 
follow Montgomery is a matter to be determined by the Court of Appeal. 
Applying Gunapathy, Chan J found that the defendants had not been 
negligent in discharging their duty to inform and advise. Chan J went on 
to say that the defendants would not have been negligent even under the 
test enunciated in Montgomery, noting that both defendants had been 
comprehensive in their discussions with the plaintiff and commending 
them for ensuring that the plaintiff understood all the risks. 
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Employers’ liability 
26.105 In Wang Baoshun v B19 Technologies Pte Ltd,109 the plaintiff, 
a construction worker was injured when a nail he was hammering broke 
and a shrapnel struck him in the eye. The injury was superficial and he 
made a full recovery before returning to work. The plaintiff, who had a 
pre-existing condition in the same eye, asked the doctor, during his 
medical review, to implant a secondary lens to treat his problem, which 
the doctor did. Subsequently, the plaintiff quit work and left Singapore 
for his native China before commencing an action against his employer 
alleging a failure to provide protective gear. On the evidence, 
District Judge Chiah Kok Khun found that the plaintiff had been 
provided safety gear but had chosen not to wear the eye goggles. The 
claim was dismissed. 
26.106 ECK Engineering & Construction v TTJ Design and Engineering 
Pte Ltd110 was a case which involved the liability of a temporary 
employer (defendant) to reimburse the main employer (plaintiff) for the 
costs of medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff to compensate the 
employee, who was injured while working for the defendant. The case 
proceeded on an unconventional route with the plaintiff, alleging that 
the defendant owed it a duty directly, rather than seeking contribution 
as a joint tortfeasor. Briefly, the plaintiff and defendant were companies 
in the construction industry. The defendant had engaged the plaintiff as 
its labour subcontractor on several occasions and, each time, a work 
order setting out the terms and conditions would be issued by the 
plaintiff. On the occasion giving rise to the incident, the defendant did 
not sign the work order, but instead sent a “cross-deployment of 
construction worker” letter setting out the terms and conditions. The 
plaintiff signed the letter and attached a copy of its Work Injury 
Compensation Act111 (“WICA”) certificate of insurance. 
26.107 The employee was injured at work and a dispute arose as to 
whether the plaintiff or defendant was liable for the employee’s medical 
costs. The plaintiff argued that the standard work order terms, which 
obliged the defendant to be liable for medical costs, applied. The 
defendant argued that the cross-deployment letter applied, under which 
the plaintiff was solely liable. District Judge Lorraine Ho determined 
that the cross-deployment letter set out the relevant contractual terms 
between the parties. That should have disposed of the matter, but 
District Judge Ho then went on to consider the plaintiff ’s argument that 
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the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty not to cause it economic loss by 
failing to take care of its employee. 
26.108 This is a novel claim for economic loss, with the closest analogy 
being a claim for loss of service. Looking more closely at the facts, the 
employee made a claim under the WICA for injuries sustained at work 
when scaffold pipes, tied together for removal, came loose and fell on 
the employee. The quantum of damages under the statutory WICA 
claim was capped at S$25,000, so the plaintiff claimed the balance 
(S$83,849.07) from the defendant, presumably on the basis of a 
negligence claim. On the facts, it would appear that the real issues were 
whether the employee was owed a non-delegable duty by the plaintiff, 
thus making the plaintiff and defendant concurrently liable, and 
whether the contract specifically dealt with such liability. 
26.109 The claim by the plaintiff, however, was pitched differently, 
arguing for a direct duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff not to 
cause it economic loss. District Judge Ho applied Spandeck. On factual 
foreseeability, the defendant argued that it was not foreseeable that the 
plaintiff would suffer damage as it was covered by WICA insurance as 
required under the contract between the plaintiff and defendant. This 
argument ignores the critical point that the insurance would only be 
payable if the plaintiff were to be held accountable and, that is to say, the 
plaintiff would be obliged to compensate the employee, the very loss in 
this case. District Judge Ho’s application of the foreseeability test is 
unclear as she distinguished between duty and remoteness without 
making clear what exactly had to be foreseen. Surely, in an economic 
loss case, some economic loss has to be foreseeable.112 
26.110 Moving to proximity, District Judge Ho considered the 
plaintiff ’s argument based on Awang bin Dollah v Shun Shing 
Construction & Engineering Co Ltd113 and rightly distinguished that case 
as one in which the court was concerned with determining whether an 
independent contractor of the main employer could be treated as the 
employer of the main employer’s employee for the purpose of 
establishing an employer’s duty. This is the very question that needed to 
be determined in this case – was the defendant the employer for the 
purposes of establishing a duty to the employee to provide a safe 
working environment? District Judge Ho indeed held that the defendant 
was the common law employer of the employee and hence owed a duty 
to the employee to provide a safe working environment. 
                                                                        
112 See Man Mohan Singh s/o Jothirambal Singh v Zurich Insurance (Singapore) Pte Ltd 
[2008] 3 SLR(R) 735. 
113 [1997] 2 SLR(R) 746. 
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26.111 The defendant then raised two arguments to deny this duty. 
First, it argued that under the contract, the plaintiff was under a duty to 
pay for the employee’s expenses. However, this did not negate the 
common law duty owed by the defendant; it simply created a contractual 
indemnity. Secondly, relying on Chandran a/l Subbiah v Dockers Marine 
Pte Ltd,114 the defendant argued that the plaintiff, as employer, owed a 
non-delegable duty to its employees and, therefore, the defendant did 
not owe a duty to the employee. District Judge Ho, holding that under a 
non-delegable duty the task could be delegated but not the duty, found 
that there was no proximity between the defendant and plaintiff for a 
duty to arise. 
26.112 With respect, the discussion on non-delegable duties is 
confusing. Put simply, the plaintiff as employer owes a duty to the 
employee. The defendant, also as employer, owes a duty to the employee. 
The duty of an employer to an employee is generally non-delegable; 
thus, if the employer delegates performance of a task pertaining to 
employee safety to an independent contractor who is negligent, the 
employer will remain liable, jointly with the independent contractor. 
Here, the plaintiff had supplied an employee to work for another 
company, wholly under that company’s control and supervision. It is 
doubtful if a non-delegable duty attaches in such a case.115 
26.113 This case was unnecessarily complicated by considering a direct 
duty owed by the defendant to avoid economic loss to the plaintiff and 
by conflating the alleged non-delegable duty of the plaintiff to the 
employee with the separate common law duty of the defendant to the 
employee. District Judge Ho was correct in her conclusion that the 
defendant was not liable to the plaintiff as the contract clearly allocated 
the liabilities of the parties. 
Road traffic 
26.114 Mohamed Rafin Bin Kadim v Chia Sze Kim Justin Mark116 
involved a motor vehicle accident between the plaintiff ’s and the 
defendant’s cars. The defendant and plaintiff gave contradictory versions 
of the accident. Based on the evidence, the judge preferred the plaintiff ’s 
version, finding the defendant negligent and the plaintiff 20% 
contributorily negligent. 
                                                                        
114 [2010] 1 SLR 786. 
115 See Woodland v Swimming Teachers Association [2014] AC 537 at [30]–[31] and 
A (A Child) v Ministry of Defence [2005] QB 183. 
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26.115 Hazwani Binte Amin v Chia Heok Meng117 was a motor vehicle 
accident case in which the plaintiff, riding a motorcycle, was injured in a 
collision with the defendant’s car at a traffic intersection. The dispute 
was on who had the right of way. It was a purely factual decision with 
District Judge Kenneth Choo finding that the plaintiff had the right of 
way and that the plaintiff had not been contributorily negligent. 
Nuisance 
26.116 The case of Nasraf Lucas Muzayyin v Shi Ka Yee,118 as 
District Judge Chiah sitting in the Magistrates’ Court observed, “centred 
round a tree” and “[f]rom it sprouted claims in nuisance, trespass and 
assault”. The plaintiffs and defendant were adjoining owners and 
occupiers of adjacent properties. The rain tree on the defendant’s 
property grew and its large and thick branches started to overhang the 
plaintiffs’ property. The plaintiffs sought the consent of the defendant 
via a letter to engage an arborist and a contractor to trim the tree but 
there was no response from the defendant. The plaintiffs proceeded to 
engage the arborist and contractor. During the trimming process, the 
defendant entered into the plaintiffs’ property and shouted profanities at 
the first plaintiff, and left when she was told to leave by the first plaintiff. 
However, she re-entered the property and removed the ignition keys of 
the truck belonging to the contractor, thereby shutting down the cherry-
picker, leaving the contractor’s worker stranded in the tree. When told 
by the first plaintiff to return the keys, she revved her car engines and 
drove her car towards the first plaintiff. 
26.117 All three claims succeeded. The overhanging tree constituted an 
unreasonable interference with the plaintiff ’s use and enjoyment of the 
property and, hence, a nuisance. In addition, the falling of dead 
branches from the tree posed a hazard. The first plaintiff was entitled to 
recover damages in respect of the expenditures he incurred to abate the 
nuisance and the amounts paid to the arborist and contractor to trim 
the rain tree. As the nuisance was a continuing one, the learned district 
judge ordered the defendant to trim the branches of the tree to fully 
abate the nuisance, failing which the plaintiff was at liberty to engage its 
own arborist and contractor to trim the branches with the expenses to 
be borne by the defendant. 
26.118 Further, the defendant, having trespassed on the plaintiffs’ 
property without permission, was liable for aggravated damages of 
S$4,000 due to her “high-handed, insulting and oppressive conduct” and 
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the fact that she was “clearly unrepentant”.119 The objective was to 
compensate the plaintiff for the additional distress and injury to his 
feelings.120 Finally, for the claim in assault, the action of the defendant in 
revving her car and driving towards the first plaintiff would have caused 
the first plaintiff reasonably to apprehend the infliction of immediate 
and unlawful force, justifying an award of S$1,500 in damages. 
26.119 On appeal, the High Court in Shi Ka Yee v Nasrat Lucas 
Muzayyin121 affirmed the decision of the Magistrates’ Court. Counsel for 
the appellant (defendant) argued that the tree in question was protected 
under s 14(1) of the Parks and Trees Act122 and could not be cut. 
However, s 14(6) stated that a protected tree may be cut “where the 
condition of the tree constitutes an immediate threat to life or property”. 
In this regard, the High Court noted the Magistrates’ Court’s finding 
that the tree with dead branches posed a hazard and held that the 
plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to cut the branches of the tree. 
Remedies 
26.120 The deceased in Zhu Xiu Chun v Rockwills Trustee Ltd123 died 
following a negligently performed liposuction. The estate and 
dependents were awarded a total of S$5,260,653.58. The defendants 
appealed to reduce the sum and the plaintiff (the administrator acting 
for the estate and dependants) appealed to increase it. The dependants 
were the deceased’s mother, his ex-wife (Ms Quek) and his two children. 
The defendants accepted liability but challenged the assessment of 
damages with respect to the coroner’s fees, dependency award to 
Ms Quek and the children, and the quantum for loss of inheritance. 
26.121 Chao Hick Tin JA, delivering the judgment of the court, 
referred to Singaporean and English authorities allowing awards for the 
cost of coroner’s inquiries and held that the coroner’s inquiry fees were 
claimable as long as they were reasonable. On the dependency claim by 
Ms Quek, evidence was accepted that the deceased was paying her 
S$9,000 a month in maintenance, of which S$7,000 was used for the 
children. The trial judge, thus, used S$2,000 as the multiplicand. On the 
assumption that the deceased had 21 years of working life left, the trial 
judge used a multiplier of 12.6 derived by applying a 40% discount to 
the number of working years to reflect the accelerated benefits and 
vicissitudes of life. 
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121 [2016] 4 SLR 972. 
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26.122 Pointing to precedents, the defendant argued for a higher 
discount. Chao JA held that the multiplier of 12.6 was not out of sync 
with existing precedents and did not change it. The defendant argued 
that as Ms Quek had divorced the deceased, she should only be entitled 
to support for a short period, on the assumption that the deceased 
would not continue supporting her. Chao JA rejected this argument, 
pointing out that reforms to the Civil Law Act124 are to ensure that 
former wives are able to be treated as dependants. The key question was 
whether there was a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit, not the 
status of the dependant as a spouse or ex-spouse. On the facts, it was 
clear that the deceased intended to provide ongoing maintenance and, 
thus, Ms Quek had a reasonable expectation of this pecuniary benefit. 
The trial judge’s award was, thus, not varied. 
26.123 The defendants challenged the quantum of dependency 
damages for the younger child, arguing that the Ms Quek, who was 
earning well could provide for the child and that the multiplier should 
be reduced. Chao JA rejected both arguments, holding that the fact that 
Ms Quek was earning was irrelevant as the deceased had independently 
provided for the child. That was a pecuniary benefit that the child 
continued to expect separately from any resources provided by the 
mother. The multiplier was held to be reasonably arrived at. Chao JA 
increased the award to the children to account for annual vacation costs 
which the deceased would have provided, but which the trial judge did 
not award. This was assessed at S$7,000 per annum per child. Similarly, 
a one-off amount for driving lessons was added. The trial judge had 
awarded an additional S$500 per month to account for the university 
years. Chao JA held that this was inadequate and varied it to an 
additional S$1,000 per month for the university years. 
26.124 In calculating the loss of inheritance, Chao JA held that the 
conventional multiplier–multiplicand approach should be used to 
determine the quantum that would have been saved by the deceased and 
been available to the dependants as their inheritance. The plaintiff 
argued that the sum should be enhanced by factoring in compound 
interest on the assumption that the deceased would have invested his 
savings and thus grown the nest egg. Chao JA rejected this argument as 
too speculative, although he held that if there was clear evidence that the 
deceased had been generating a consistent rate of return, then that 
would be taken into account. Here, there was no such evidence. Chao JA 
also held that the post-retirement costs of the deceased should be taken 
into account. 
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26.125 Chao JA held that the trial judge had not erred in determining 
the multiplicand, but held that the trial judge had erred in applying the 
same 40% discount used to determine Ms Quek’s dependency claim to 
derive the multiplier for the children’s inheritance claim. This was 
because the discount was in part to reflect the value of the accelerated 
benefit, which in the case of the dependency claim was 21 years, based 
on the notional retirement age of 65. The inheritance, however, would 
only be triggered on the deceased’s notional death at 80, 15 years later. 
Thus, there was a greater accelerated benefit with the inheritance 
(36 years as opposed to 21 years) which necessitated a greater discount. 
Taking this factor as well as the diminishment of the deceased’s wealth 
due to the post-retirement personal expenses, Chao JA applied a 70% 
discount, which resulted in a net figure of S$3,698,100. Based on the 
deceased’s last known will, the trial judge decided that 52.56% of that 
amount would constitute the children’s inheritance. 
26.126 The defendants’ argument that the children would no longer be 
dependants at the time of inheritance was rightly treated as irrelevant by 
Chao JA. The inheritance was a pecuniary benefit that they reasonably 
expected regardless of whether they were dependants at the time. 
26.127 The plaintiff in Siew Pick Chiang v Hyundai Engineering and 
Construction Co Ltd125 was cycling along a pavement when she was 
struck by cables falling from the defendant’s worksite. The defendant 
was found 100% liable in negligence; this decision concerned the 
assessment of damages. Although the physical injuries sustained by the 
plaintiff were minor, they led to severe psychiatric injury in the form of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) resulting in the plaintiff being 
hospitalised for more than two years, including up to the time of the 
assessment of damages. 
26.128 The plaintiff claimed over S$26m in damages. The significant 
heads were: 
(a) medical and hospital expenses (pre-trial: S$2.6m,  
post-trial: S$11m); 
(b) part-time caregivers for the plaintiff and her son  
(pre-trial: S$940,000, post-trial: S$5.1m); 
(c) loss of earnings (pre-trial: S$450,000, post-trial: 
S$1.7m); 
(d) taxi fares (pre-trial: S$53,000, post-trial: S$1.25m); and 
(e) pain and suffering: S$261,000. 
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After a detailed assessment, Woo J awarded the plaintiff almost 
S$8.65m, a record figure in a personal injuries claim. The key heads of 
damage are noted below. 
26.129 The main head under pain and suffering was a claim for 
S$80,000 for the PTSD. Even though the range for severe PTSD under 
the Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury 
Cases126 set a range of S$25,000–S$50,000, Woo J held that the severity 
of PTSD in this case was such that the normal range did not apply and 
awarded S$80,000. Smaller sums were awarded for, among other things, 
loss of memory, head-related injuries, vertigo, fibromyalgia, and other 
muscular degeneration. Woo J also awarded S$6,000 for the plaintiff ’s 
loss of marriage prospect, arguably a head of damages that is outdated. 
26.130 The main head of damages under special damages related to 
medical and hospital expenses. Woo J carefully examined the expenses 
that were necessary, for which reasonable awards were made and 
disallowed claims for expenses that were deemed unnecessary or 
unreasonable. One notable example of an unreasonable expense was that 
plaintiff ’s claim for hospital stays on the basis of an executive room or 
suite. These were disallowed, although Woo J held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to stay in a normal single room. The defendant argued that the 
plaintiff should have stayed at a restructured hospital where the costs 
would have been lower. Given the seriousness of the plaintiff ’s PTSD, 
Woo J accepted that it would not have been reasonable to move the 
plaintiff out of the care of the team of doctors treating her at Mount 
Elizabeth Hospital. The principle here is that the plaintiff was entitled to 
reasonable medical care, which in her particular case would not be 
afforded if she were to be transferred to a restructured hospital. Woo J 
allowed the plaintiff ’s claim for her hospital bill at 80% of the total 
claim. 
26.131 On the plaintiff ’s pre-trial claim for taxi fare, Woo J held that 
reasonable transport expenses should be awarded rather than the 
claimed S$53,000 for which no receipts had been provided. A reasonable 
amount was calculated on the basis of S$300 per month for 22 months 
from April 2014 to February 2016, amounting to S$6,600. The part-time 
care claim of almost S$940,000 was also not supported by documentary 
evidence or receipts. Woo J awarded a sum based on the cost of full-time 
care for the 76 months from the date of the accident to the assessment, 
which amounted to S$51,680 calculated at S$680 per month. The claim 
for part-time care for her son was dismissed for lack of evidence. 
A modest amount was also awarded for equipment. 
                                                                        
126 Guidelines for the Assessment of General Damages in Personal Injury Cases 
(Academy Publishing, 2010). 
© 2017 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders. 
 
  
(2016) 17 SAL Ann Rev Tort Law 697 
 
26.132 For general damages, Woo J calculated the loss of future 
earnings using a multiplicand of S$6,000, based on her average monthly 
income in the three years leading up to the accident. The plaintiff was 
42 years old at the time of assessment and was assumed to continue 
working till 72 years, giving 30 years of lost earning years. Taking into 
account the benefit of accelerated payment and the vicissitudes of life, 
Woo J used 15 years as the appropriate multiplier and awarded 
S$1,080,000. 
26.133 For future expenses, Woo J used the life expectancy of 85 years, 
reduced to 80 years to account for the plaintiff ’s loss of life expectancy 
due to her accident, leaving her with 38 years to be compensated. Woo J 
based the multiplier on half of that, which was 19 years. Appropriate 
multiplicands were used for the various medical costs, including doctors’ 
fees, treatments, and medication. The multiplicand for future hospital 
stays was calculated based on the plaintiff ’s actual costs but adjusted to 
eliminate the excess costs such as executive room stay, food for visitors 
and so on. The future hospital stay was calculated on the basis of two 
distinct periods: from the date of assessment to the end of 2016 on the 
assumption that the plaintiff would be in hospital for the whole period; 
and from January 2017 for 17 years on the assumption that the plaintiff 
would require one months’ hospital stay each year. 
26.134 The plaintiff ’s future transport costs were calculated on the 
basis of S$300 per month for 19 years. Future caregiver costs were 
calculated on the basis of employing a foreign domestic worker at S$678 
per month for 19 years. Further damages were awarded for 
miscellaneous costs. The damages were awarded with interest at 3% 
from the date of the writ of summons to the date of judgment and at the 
statutory rate of 5.33% from the date of judgment to the date of 
payment. 
26.135 Seow Hwa Chuan v Ong Wah Chuan127 involved two law suits 
arising from personal injuries suffered in two road accidents in 2006 
and 2007 respectively. For the first accident, interlocutory judgment was 
given against the defendant with damages to be assessed. The second 
suit was settled and consent judgment entered against another party 
with damages to be assessed. The deputy registrar assessed the damages 
as follows: pain and suffering (S$30,000); cost of future medical care 
(S$2,000); and loss of earning capacity (S$40,000). The decision was 
appealed against by both parties to the District Court, and the plaintiff 
also argued on appeal that he ought to have been awarded pre-trial loss 
of earnings. 
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26.136 On appeal, the amount awarded for pain and suffering was 
increased to S$50,000. The learned judge awarded damages for the 
personal injuries including the right wrist injury, chest contusion  
(that is, haematoma) and haematoma on the left elbow and neck strain, 
exacerbation of pre-existing anterolisthesis, and right traverse process 
fractures. With respect to the PTSD, the judge noted that this arose from 
the first accident and that the plaintiff had become better by the time of 
the second accident. As such, the second accident did not have an 
impact on the PTSD and the award was limited to the period between 
the two accidents. 
26.137 The award for loss of earning capacity remained at S$40,000. 
The first accident resulted in the termination of the plaintiff ’s 
employment with his then employer. He then looked for a job that 
would not further aggravate his medical conditions and finally found a 
job that paid a higher salary than his former job. However, the learned 
judge noted that if he were to lose the current job, the medical condition 
caused by the first accident would put him at a disadvantaged position. 
In arriving at the award, the learned judge also took into consideration 
the finding that it was unlikely that the plaintiff could have achieved 
higher qualifications as an engineer and be promoted to a higher 
position had he remained in the company. 
26.138 With regard to the claim for future medical expenses, a nominal 
sum of S$5,000 was awarded. It was not clear from the evidence whether 
the injuries (namely the degeneration of the cervical spine and lumbar 
spine), which required future medical treatment was attributable to the 
first accident or stemmed from the plaintiff ’s pre-existing medical 
conditions. 
26.139 Finally, as to the award for the loss of earnings during the four 
months when the plaintiff was unemployed, there was evidence that the 
plaintiff expended efforts to sign up for different jobs despite having 
residual pain and PTSD from the first accident. However, pre-trial loss 
of earnings after the second accident was denied. The second accident 
caused him to be hospitalised for four days with four months of 
hospitalisation leave. The District Court treated the second accident as a 
“supervening event”, which discharged the defendant from further 
liability for pre-trial loss of earnings after the first accident. 
26.140 In Tan Chee Kiang v Huang He Jue,128 the plaintiff, a technician, 
suffered injuries at the workplace and claimed against a co-worker, the 
first defendant, and the employer, the second defendant. With regard to 
the spinal injuries, erectile dysfunction and neuropathic bladder, the 
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plaintiff was awarded S$70,000 as a global sum in respect of the past as 
well as for the future pain, suffering, and loss of amenities caused by the 
injuries. The learned judge further provided a breakdown of the sums 
awarded for each of the injuries based on case authorities. 
26.141 The court awarded the plaintiff pre-trial loss of income for the 
period even after he ceased employment with the second defendant. The 
second defendant had terminated the plaintiff ’s employment after he 
notified the employer of his decision to withdraw his statutory claim for 
work-injury compensation and, instead, pursue a claim at common law 
in negligence. The plaintiff attempted to find other jobs but was 
hampered by his physical disabilities and lack of educational 
qualifications. Hence, the defendants could not prove that the plaintiff 
had failed to mitigate his loss by looking for alternative employment. 
26.142 The court also awarded the plaintiff S$15,000 for loss of earning 
capacity taking into account the plaintiff ’s age at the time of the 
accident, his injuries, the difficulties to be encountered in competition 
for jobs, as well as the consequences of the stroke and its effects on his 
earning capacity. Loss of earning capacity is not merely an alternate 
measure when a plaintiff is unable to prove his claim for loss of future 
earnings.129 Further, loss of earning capacity may be awarded even when 
the plaintiff was unemployed at the time of trial, that is, where the risk 
had already eventualised.130 
26.143 In another personal injuries case in Sun Delong v Teo 
Poh Soon131 (“Sun Delong”), a sum of S$45,000 was awarded in respect of 
the plaintiff ’s head injuries (applying the case of Ang Siam Hua v Teo 
Cheng Hoe).132 However, there was no evidence of psychological injury 
or cognitive impairment and no proof that the plaintiff had a higher risk 
of developing dementia or epilepsy as a result of the accident. Awards 
were also made for various other injuries (including ones in the 
pelvis/lower limb, shoulder, abdomen, and lung, as well as lacerations 
and abrasions). 
26.144 With respect to hospital and medical expenses and nursing 
home charges, the plaintiff ’s employer paid the nursing home charges 
and part of the hospital/medical expenses and the plaintiff paid the 
remainder. The employer was responsible under the Employment of 
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Foreign Manpower Act (Work Passes) Regulations 2012133 to “bear the 
costs of the foreign employee’s upkeep (excluding the provision of food) 
and maintenance in Singapore” including “the provision of medical 
treatment”. Choo Han Teck J interpreted the words to mean that 
employers are obliged to provide for the “medical treatment” of their 
foreign employees but only to the extent that it is necessary for their 
“upkeep and maintenance”. The defendants were, therefore, not absolved 
from liability to compensate for the plaintiff ’s loss just because of the 
employer’s statutory obligation. 
26.145 Choo J also cited Donnelly v Joyce134 (“Donnelly”), which held 
that the plaintiff, who was injured by the defendant’s negligence in a 
road accident and needed the special care of his mother who gave up 
her job, was entitled to recover for his mother’s loss of wages on the 
basis that it was the plaintiff ’s loss.135 Choo J found the English Court of 
Appeal’s characterisation in Donnelly of the loss based on the need for 
the nursing services to be an “awkward characterization of the plaintiff ’s 
loss”. He also opined that the Donnelly principle (that is, the provision of 
the needs by the third party is never deductible from the damages award 
even if the plaintiff has neither the legal nor moral obligation to repay 
the provider) to be “too broad”.136 
26.146 His Honour concluded that the plaintiff should not be allowed 
to claim from the tortfeasor for needs that have already been provided 
for by a third party if he is under no obligation to repay the provider. In 
the present case, the learned judge found that the plaintiff was obliged to 
repay the money claimed to the employer once he had recovered 
damages from the defendants and, hence, there would not be any double 
recovery. The learned judge, thus, awarded the plaintiff the entire sum 
of hospital/medical expenses and nursing home charges. 
26.147 The subsequent case of Minichit Bunhom v Jazali bin Kastari137 
(“Minichit Bunhom”) distinguished Sun Delong. A foreign worker was 
injured in a road traffic accident. The accident occurred in the course of 
employment with an employer and the employer paid for the worker’s 
medical expenses. The worker claimed the medical expenses as special 
damages from the tortfeasor. 
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26.148 The claim was rejected by the court. The Employment of 
Foreign Manpower Act138 (“EFMA”) imposed a duty on the employer to 
bear the cost of medical treatment arising from the accident. It is a non-
delegable statutory duty. Moreover, in such an instance, there is no 
expectation of repayment to the employer. The employer also has to 
maintain a minimum medical insurance under Condition 4 of Part IV of 
the Fourth Schedule of the Regulations to protect itself from potential 
liability for the medical expenses. It should be noted that Choo J in 
Sun Delong was not referred to Condition 4 of the Regulations or to 
Lee Chiang Theng v Public Prosecutor139 on the “heavy responsibilities” 
that employers owe to their foreign workers under the EFMA. In 
addition, it is possible to limit Sun Delong to a case of medical treatment 
in respect of injuries suffered outside of the course of employment unlike 
the situation in Minichit Bunhom. 
26.149 The present decision was also premised on the need to avoid 
double recovery for the worker arising from two possibilities. First, 
double recovery would arise if the tortfeasor were to pay the worker for 
those expenses which had already been paid for by his employer. 
Secondly, the employer was entitled to claim on the insurance policy 
maintained on behalf of the foreign employee for the same amount. 
Defences 
Contributory negligence 
26.150 The plaintiff in Arnold William v Tanoto Shipyard Pte Ltd140 was 
a freelance diver who was injured while carrying out work for the 
defendants. The defendant had placed large floaters under a barge they 
were moving, after which they called on the plaintiff to remove two 
floaters that were stuck under the barge. The floaters were large and 
filled with high-pressure air. The plaintiff successfully removed the first 
floater. The second floater suddenly shot out from under the barge and 
struck the plaintiff, who was waiting in the water for a rope to remove 
the second floater. The District Court found the defendant negligent in 
failing to assess the risks, overinflating the floaters and using an unsafe 
method to remove the floaters. The plaintiff was found 50% 
contributorily negligent, as the district judge held that the plaintiff, who 
had 30 years’ experience, should have appreciated the risks. In particular, 
the judge held that the plaintiff had released the air from the floaters 
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carelessly and had failed to keep a safe distance away from the floater 
while waiting. 
26.151 Lai Siu Chiu SJ allowed the plaintiff ’s appeal against the finding 
of contributory negligence. Lai SJ found that the defendant had been 
negligent in grossly overinflating the floaters and that the plaintiff was 
justified in assuming that this was a routine procedure. As the plaintiff 
did not know that the floaters were overinflated, he could not be held 
contributorily negligent. Lai SJ noted that an appellate court would be 
slow to interfere with the factual finding of a lower court, but held that 
in this case, the trial court’s finding on contributory negligence was not 
supported by the evidence. 
26.152 Asnah bte Ab Rahman v Li Jianlin141 (“Asnah”) was a somewhat 
controversial decision of the Court of Appeal which split 2:1 in 
determining whether a pedestrian was contributorily negligent. The 
facts were that a taxi, driven by the defendant, collided with the plaintiff 
while he was crossing a dual carriageway road at a signalised pedestrian 
crossing with the light in his favour. The plaintiff had safely crossed the 
first lane before he was hit by the taxi as he stepped into the second lane. 
The defendant conceded negligence, but raised the defence of 
contributory negligence, which failed at the High Court. On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal decided by majority that the plaintiff (respondent) had 
been contributorily negligent and reduced his damages by 15%. 
26.153 Chao JA (with Quentin Loh J), delivering the majority 
judgment, identified the three critical questions for determination; the 
first two were of general application and the third specific to the case: 
(a) Does a pedestrian owe himself a duty to check for 
oncoming traffic before entering a signalised pedestrian 
crossing even with the lights in the pedestrian’s favour? 
(b) Has a pedestrian a duty to keep a proper lookout before 
stepping onto the second half of the road? 
(c) Did the respondent fail to keep a proper lookout? 
On the first question, Chao JA noted that while Singaporeans are 
generally law-abiding, that does not necessarily mean that pedestrians 
shall be lulled into a false sense of security and assume that there will be 
no careless drivers on the roads. Relying on statistics of motorists 
running red lights, Chao JA held that this is a real risk which reasonable 
pedestrians have to guard against. It was no defence for the pedestrian 
to argue that he or she had a lawful right to cross the road when the 
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lights were in favour: the point was that there was a foreseeable risk that 
the respondent should have guarded against. Chao JA referred to r 22 of 
the Highway Code142 which requires that a pedestrian wait at signalised 
pedestrian crossings until the traffic has come to a standstill, implicitly 
recognising the risk of errant motorist running red lights. It does not 
matter how long the lights have turned in the pedestrian’s favour: the 
need to keep a proper lookout is ever-present. This is not to say that the 
duty is meant to be an onerous one; it is simply to say that the duty 
exists. 
26.154 The respondent had relied on the English decision of Bailey v 
Geddes143 (“Bailey”), which suggested that a pedestrian can never be 
contributorily negligent while lawfully crossing at a pedestrian crossing. 
Referring to subsequent English decisions, Chao JA held that Bailey has 
to be read in context. In that case, the pedestrian had almost completed 
the crossing when he was hit; on the facts, it could not be said that he 
was negligent as it would be unreasonable to expect a pedestrian to 
continue looking out for traffic throughout the crossing. As long as the 
pedestrian had checked as he commenced crossing, he would have 
discharged his obligation. 
26.155 Arguably, the respondent in this case was in a similar position 
as the plaintiff in Bailey, as he had crossed more than halfway across the 
road. However, the fact that this was a dual carriageway was relevant. 
Referring to r 20 of the Highway Code, Chao JA noted that where there 
was a central refuge, each half of the crossing should be treated as a 
separate crossing. Although in this case, there was no central refuge, 
Chao JA held that the centre divider in this case effectively split the 
crossing into two and, therefore, the respondent was under a duty to 
stop at the centre divider of the road and check before proceeding across 
the second half of the road. This decision was supported by the fact that 
the topography would have prevented the respondent from checking for 
oncoming traffic on the second half of the road as his vision would have 
been obstructed. 
26.156 Finally, Chao JA addressed the specific question of whether the 
respondent was in fact contributorily negligent. Based on the speed of 
the appellant’s vehicle, the ease with which the respondent could have 
noted its presence and halted before stepping onto the road and the 
gravity of the potential injury, Chao JA found the respondent to have 
fallen below the standard of care expected. Referring to other motor 
accident cases, Chao JA found the respondent to be 15% contributorily 
negligent. 
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26.157 Menon CJ delivered a dissenting judgment. While agreeing with 
the majority that the focus of the contributory negligence inquiry was 
on the plaintiff and not the defendant’s conduct, Menon CJ highlighted 
that this inquiry could not be totally divorced from the context, 
including the defendant’s conduct. The crucial question was whether it 
was “reasonable to expect the victim to guard against the particular type 
of conduct that caused the damage”. On the particular facts, Menon CJ 
differed from the majority who had assessed the respondent’s response 
with respect to a general risk of motorists beating the traffic light. In 
Menon CJ’s view, the appellant’s conduct went well beyond general 
carelessness and was unacceptably dangerous. While it is fair that a 
pedestrian shall guard against ordinary careless conduct of other road 
users, it will be unfair to require a pedestrian to guard against conduct 
that goes “beyond recklessness and [is] downright dangerous”. 
26.158 Menon CJ went on to disagree with the minority on their 
application of rr 20 and 22 of the Highway Code, holding that r 22 is 
limited to situations where the pedestrian crossing light has just turned 
red, and that r 20 was inapplicable because the centre divider in this case 
was not comparable to a central refuge, being too narrow to provide a 
safe waiting area. 
26.159 Given the different starting points in terms of the contextual 
inquiry into contributory negligence, it was not surprising that 
Menon CJ took a different view of the precedents considered by the 
majority, concluding that they supported the argument that a pedestrian 
who has embarked properly on a crossing at a signalised pedestrian 
crossing shall not ordinarily be found contributorily negligent for failing 
to keep checking for oncoming traffic. Menon CJ also disagreed with the 
majority on its finding that the respondent must have been negligent, 
holding that this conclusion was speculative and that the burden had not 
been discharged by the appellant. 
Non-delegable duty 
26.160 The facts in Management Corporation Strata Title Plan 
No 3322 v Tiong Aik Construction Pte Ltd144 (“Tiong Aik”) were that a 
condominium had been erected with defects in the common property, 
resulting in economic loss to the appellant, the management 
corporation, which sued four defendants: Mer Vue Developments 
Pte Ltd (“developer”); Tiong Aik Construction Pte Ltd (“Main 
Contractor”); RSP Architects Planners & Engineers (Pte) Ltd 
(“Architect”); and Squire Mech Private Limited. The actions against the 
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developer included claims for breach of contract, breach of duty in the 
tort of negligence, and breach of statutory duty under the Building 
Maintenance and Strata Management Act.145 The actions against the 
Main Contractor were for negligence and breach of contract; the claims 
against the remaining two defendants were in negligence only. All the 
allegations of negligence against the first three defendants were with 
respect to the acts of their subcontractors and all three pleaded in 
defence that they were not liable for the torts of their independent 
contractors. 
26.161 The High Court decided that the Main Contractor and the 
Architect could not be held vicariously liable for the torts of their 
independent contractors, and that they were not directly liable in 
negligence as they had exercised reasonable care in appointing the 
independent contractors. Further, the High Court held that neither the 
Main Contractor nor the Architect owed a non-delegable common law 
duty to the appellant and that any non-delegable statutory duty owed 
under the Building Control Act146 did not extend beyond compliance 
with safety regulations. The appellant brought an appeal against the 
High Court’s decision, naming the Main Contractor and the Architect as 
respondents. The sole issue on appeal was whether the Main Contractor 
and the Architect owed a non-delegable common law duty to the 
appellant to build and design the condominium with reasonable care. 
26.162 As its effect is to hold the defendant strictly liable, courts are 
cautious in recognising new categories of non-delegable duties. The UK 
Supreme Court in Woodland set out some general principles with 
respect to recognising non-delegable duties. It noted two broad 
categories: one pertaining to ultra-hazardous activities and another 
pertaining to special relationships between the defendant and plaintiff. 
Chao JA, delivering the judgment in Tiong Aik, endorsed Woodland as 
the approach to be followed in Singapore, subject to the qualification 
that it must be fair and just to recognise a novel category of non-
delegable duties. Chao JA stated:147 
In our judgment, moving forward, to demonstrate that a non-
delegable duty arises on a particular set of facts, a claimant must 
minimally be able to satisfy the court either that: (a) the facts fall 
within one of the established categories of non-delegable duties; or 
(b) the facts possess all the [five Woodland] features … However, we 
would hasten to add that (a) and (b) above merely lay down threshold 
requirements for satisfying the court that a non-delegable duty exists – 
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the court will additionally have to take into account the fairness and 
reasonableness of imposing a non-delegable duty in the particular 
circumstance, as well as the relevant policy considerations in our local 
context. [emphasis in original] 
26.163 Chao JA then set out the five Woodland features:148 
(a) The claimant is a patient or a child, or for some other reason 
is especially vulnerable or dependent on the protection of the defendant 
against the risk of injury. Other examples are likely to be prisoners and 
residents in care homes. 
(b) There is an antecedent relationship between the claimant and 
the defendant, independent of the negligent act or omission itself, 
(i) which places the claimant in the actual custody, charge or care of the 
defendant, and (ii) from which it is possible to impute to the 
defendant the assumption of a positive duty to protect the claimant from 
harm, and not just a duty to refrain from conduct which will 
foreseeably damage the claimant. It is characteristic of such 
relationships that they involve an element of control over the claimant, 
which varies in intensity from one situation to another … 
(c) The claimant has no control over how the defendant chooses 
to perform those obligations, ie, whether personally or through 
employees or through third parties. 
(d) The defendant has delegated to a third party some function 
which is an integral part of the positive duty which he has assumed 
towards the claimant; and the third party is exercising, for the purpose 
of the function thus delegated to him, the defendant’s custody or care 
of the claimant and the element of control that goes with it. 
(e) The third party has been negligent not in some collateral 
respect but in the performance of the very function assumed by the 
defendant and delegated by the defendant to him. 
[emphasis in original] 
26.164 Chao JA noted that the existing categories of non-delegable 
duties include: the duty of an employer to its employee; the duty of 
hospitals and health authorities to patients; the duty of schools and 
school authorities to students; and cases involving extra-hazardous 
operations. This case raised the question of whether a new category for 
construction professionals should be recognised. Chao JA held that 
construction professionals should not be held to owe a non-delegable 
duty. It is accepted practice in the construction industry to use 
independent contractors and there are no compelling policy reasons to 
disturb this practice or to circumvent the “independent contractor 
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defence”. The Woodland criteria were not met and it would not be fair 
and just to hold construction professionals liable for the negligence of 
their independent contractors. 
26.165 The respondents and appellants in Ng Huat Seng v Munib 
Mohammad Madni149 were neighbours, owning adjoining landed 
property. The respondents’ property was on land that was two metres 
higher than the appellants’. An independent contractor, engaged by the 
respondents to demolish and rebuild their house, negligently caused 
debris to fall onto and damage the appellants’ property. The appellants 
sued the respondents alleging: negligence in selecting and supervising 
the independent contractor; vicarious liability for the negligence of the 
independent contractor; and liability for breach of a non-delegable duty, 
on the basis that the activity was ultra-hazardous. The district judge 
found against the appellant on all allegations. On appeal, See Kee 
Oon JC upheld the district court’s judgment. 
26.166 Counsel for the appellants argued that following the recent 
decisions of Various Claimants v Catholic Child Welfare Society150 and 
Cox v Ministry of Justice,151 a broader concept of vicarious liability that 
goes beyond the “traditional test of employment” should be applied. 
See JC reaffirmed that, despite the extension of vicarious liability in 
these two cases to include relationships that are “akin to employment”, a 
defendant who has engaged an independent contractor can still rely on 
“the independent contractor defence”. 
26.167 On whether the respondents had been negligent in their 
selection of the independent contractor, See JC concluded that they had 
exercised reasonable care in checking that the independent contractors 
held a valid licence and had a clean record. They had also relied on the 
recommendation of a firm of professional architects and had sought the 
views of friends who had previously engaged the independent 
contractors. As laypersons, after carefully selecting the independent 
contractor, they were entitled to rely on his expertise. See JC went to 
consider the appellants’ argument as to whether the respondents “owed 
an additional duty, over and above this duty of care in selection, to 
‘ensure that reasonable care was taken by [the independent contractor] 
to avoid harm to the Appellants and to their property’”. 
26.168 This question conflates two issues: a duty to supervise and a 
duty to ensure that care was taken by the independent contractors. The 
former is the general duty, giving rise to liability if the respondents had 
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been negligent. The latter is in fact the non-delegable duty, giving rise to 
liability on the part of the respondents if the independent contractor 
had been negligent. These two questions should have been separated. 
26.169 The final question that arose was whether the duty owed by the 
respondents was non-delegable on the ground that the activity delegated 
to the independent contractors was ultra-hazardous. See JC referred to 
the classic case of Honeywill and Stein Ltd v Larkin Brothers (London’s 
Commercial Photographers) Ltd152 (“Honeywill”), noting that while the 
principle had not been applied in Singapore, it had been recognised in 
several Court of Appeal decisions.153 See JC then noted the English 
Court of Appeal’s dictum in Biffa Waste Services Ltd v Maschinenfabrik 
Ernst Hese GmbH154 (“Biffa”), criticising the ultra-hazardous rule and 
confining Honeywill to its facts. 
26.170 Agreeing with Biffa that the ultra-hazardous rule is problematic 
because of the fine line dividing what is ultra-hazardous and what is not, 
See JC emphasised that the rule shall only apply where the activity 
undertaken is “exceptionally dangerous whatever precautions are taken” 
or constitutes “a dangerous operation in its intrinsic nature”. See JC, 
thus, confined the rule to its narrowest ambit. On the facts, See JC held 
that demolition per se was not exceptionally dangerous, but was only so 
because of the particular context, including the proximity of the houses 
and their relative elevations. While this narrow approach to ultra-
hazardous activity may be justifiable for policy reasons, it is interesting 
to contrast this with Menon CJ’s approach to contributory negligence in 
Asnah, where he emphasised the importance of context in determining 
the responsibility of the plaintiff for his own safety. Arguably, a 
contextual approach can be applied to determine whether an activity is 
ultra-hazardous. For example, there is a world of difference between 
rolling a ten-tonne ball on a flat field and undertaking precisely the 
same activity at the edge of a precipice at the bottom of which are 
glass houses. 
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